

“(2) Extortionate credit transactions are characterized by the use, or the express or implicit threat of the use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to person, reputation, or property as a means of enforcing repayment. Among the factors which have rendered past efforts at prosecution almost wholly ineffective has been the existence of exclusionary rules of evidence stricter than necessary for the protection of constitutional rights.

“(3) Extortionate credit transactions are carried on to a substantial extent in interstate and foreign commerce and through the means and instrumentalities of such commerce. Even where extortionate credit transactions are purely intrastate in character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate and foreign commerce.

“(4) Extortionate credit transactions directly impair the effectiveness and frustrate the purposes of the laws enacted by the Congress on the subject of bankruptcies.

“(b) On the basis of the findings stated in subsection (a) of this section, the Congress determines that the provisions of chapter 42 of title 18 of the United States Code are necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying into execution the powers of Congress to regulate commerce and to establish uniform and effective laws on the subject of bankruptcy.”

ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS BY ATTORNEY GENERAL

Section 203 of Pub. L. 90-321 directed Attorney General to make an annual report to Congress of activities of Department of Justice in enforcement of this chapter, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 97-375, title I, §109(b), Dec. 21, 1982, 96 Stat. 1820.

§ 892. Making extortionate extensions of credit

(a) Whoever makes any extortionate extension of credit, or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

(b) In any prosecution under this section, if it is shown that all of the following factors were present in connection with the extension of credit in question, there is prima facie evidence that the extension of credit was extortionate, but this subsection is nonexclusive and in no way limits the effect or applicability of subsection (a):

(1) The repayment of the extension of credit, or the performance of any promise given in consideration thereof, would be unenforceable, through civil judicial processes against the debtor

(A) in the jurisdiction within which the debtor, if a natural person, resided or

(B) in every jurisdiction within which the debtor, if other than a natural person, was incorporated or qualified to do business

at the time the extension of credit was made.

(2) The extension of credit was made at a rate of interest in excess of an annual rate of 45 per centum calculated according to the actuarial method of allocating payments made on a debt between principal and interest, pursuant to which a payment is applied first to the accumulated interest and the balance is applied to the unpaid principal.

(3) At the time the extension of credit was made, the debtor reasonably believed that either

(A) one or more extensions of credit by the creditor had been collected or attempted to be collected by extortionate means, or the nonrepayment thereof had been punished by extortionate means; or

(B) the creditor had a reputation for the use of extortionate means to collect extensions of credit or to punish the nonrepayment thereof.

(4) Upon the making of the extension of credit, the total of the extensions of credit by the creditor to the debtor then outstanding, including any unpaid interest or similar charges, exceeded \$100.

(c) In any prosecution under this section, if evidence has been introduced tending to show the existence of any of the circumstances described in subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2), and direct evidence of the actual belief of the debtor as to the creditor's collection practices is not available, then for the purpose of showing the understanding of the debtor and the creditor at the time the extension of credit was made, the court may in its discretion allow evidence to be introduced tending to show the reputation as to collection practices of the creditor in any community of which the debtor was a member at the time of the extension.

(Added Pub. L. 90-321, title II, §202(a), May 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 160; amended Pub. L. 103-322, title XXXIII, §330016(1)(L), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)

AMENDMENTS

1994—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103-322 substituted “fined under this title” for “fined not more than \$10,000”.

§ 893. Financing extortionate extensions of credit

Whoever willfully advances money or property, whether as a gift, as a loan, as an investment, pursuant to a partnership or profit-sharing agreement, or otherwise, to any person, with reasonable grounds to believe that it is the intention of that person to use the money or property so advanced directly or indirectly for the purpose of making extortionate extensions of credit, shall be fined under this title or an amount not exceeding twice the value of the money or property so advanced, whichever is greater, or shall be imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

(Added Pub. L. 90-321, title II, §202(a), May 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 161; amended Pub. L. 103-322, title XXXIII, §330016(1)(L), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)

AMENDMENTS

1994—Pub. L. 103-322 substituted “fined under this title” for “fined not more than \$10,000”.

§ 894. Collection of extensions of credit by extortionate means

(a) Whoever knowingly participates in any way, or conspires to do so, in the use of any extortionate means

(1) to collect or attempt to collect any extension of credit, or

(2) to punish any person for the nonrepayment thereof,

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

(b) In any prosecution under this section, for the purpose of showing an implicit threat as a means of collection, evidence may be introduced

tending to show that one or more extensions of credit by the creditor were, to the knowledge of the person against whom the implicit threat was alleged to have been made, collected or attempted to be collected by extortionate means or that the nonrepayment thereof was punished by extortionate means.

(c) In any prosecution under this section, if evidence has been introduced tending to show the existence, at the time the extension of credit in question was made, of the circumstances described in section 892(b)(1) or the circumstances described in section 892(b)(2), and direct evidence of the actual belief of the debtor as to the creditor's collection practices is not available, then for the purpose of showing that words or other means of communication, shown to have been employed as a means of collection, in fact carried an express or implicit threat, the court may in its discretion allow evidence to be introduced tending to show the reputation of the defendant in any community of which the person against whom the alleged threat was made was a member at the time of the collection or attempt at collection.

(Added Pub. L. 90-321, title II, §202(a), May 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 161; amended Pub. L. 103-322, title XXXIII, §330016(1)(L), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)

AMENDMENTS

1994—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103-322 substituted “fined under this title” for “fined not more than \$10,000” in concluding provisions.

[§ 895. Repealed. Pub. L. 91-452, title II, § 223(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 929]

Section, Pub. L. 90-321, title II, §202(a), May 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 162, related to immunity from prosecution of any witness compelled to testify or produce evidence after claiming his privilege against self-incrimination. See section 6001 et seq. of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPEAL

Repeal effective on sixtieth day following Oct. 15, 1970, and not to affect any immunity to which any individual was entitled under this section by reason of any testimony given before sixtieth day following Oct. 15, 1970, see section 260 of Pub. L. 91-452, set out as an Effective Date; Savings Provision note under section 6001 of this title.

§ 896. Effect on State laws

This chapter does not preempt any field of law with respect to which State legislation would be permissible in the absence of this chapter. No law of any State which would be valid in the absence of this chapter may be held invalid or inapplicable by virtue of the existence of this chapter, and no officer, agency, or instrumentality of any State may be deprived by virtue of this chapter of any jurisdiction over any offense over which it would have jurisdiction in the absence of this chapter.

(Added Pub. L. 90-321, title II, §202(a), May 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 162.)

CHAPTER 43—FALSE PERSONATION

Sec.	
911.	Citizen of the United States.
912.	Officer or employee of the United States.

Sec.	
913.	Impersonator making arrest or search.
914.	Creditors of the United States.
915.	Foreign diplomats, consuls or officers.
916.	4-H Club members or agents.
917.	Red Cross members or agents.

§ 911. Citizen of the United States

Whoever falsely and willfully represents himself to be a citizen of the United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 742; Pub. L. 103-322, title XXXIII, §330016(1)(H), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on subsection (a), paragraph (18) and subsection (d), of section 746, title 8, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Aliens and Nationality (Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876, §346(a), par. (18), and (d), 54 Stat. 1165, 1167).

Section consolidates said provisions of section 746, title 8, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Aliens and Nationality. The word “willfully” was substituted for “knowingly”, “\$1,000” for “\$5,000”, and “three years” for “five years”, to harmonize with congressional intent evidenced by the other sections of this chapter.

Minor changes were made in phraseology and unnecessary words were omitted.

AMENDMENTS

1994—Pub. L. 103-322 substituted “fined under this title” for “fined not more than \$1,000”.

§ 912. Officer or employee of the United States

Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 742; Pub. L. 103-322, title XXXIII, §330016(1)(H), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§76 and 123 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§32 and 66, 35 Stat. 1095, 1100; Feb. 28, 1938, ch. 37, 52 Stat. 82).

Section consolidates sections 76 and 123 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed. The effect of this consolidation was to increase the punishment for revenue officers from \$500 to \$1,000 and from 2 years to 3 years, and to rephrase in the alternative the mandatory punishment provision.

This section now applies the same punishment to all officers and agents of the United States found guilty of false personation.

Words “agency or” were inserted to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definitive section 6 of this title.) Other words referring to “authority of any corporation owned or controlled by the United States” were omitted for the same reason. (See *Pierce v. U.S.*, 1941, 62 S. Ct. 237, 314 U.S. 306, 86 L. Ed. 226.)

The words “with the intent to defraud the United States or any person”, contained in said section 76 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., were omitted as meaningless in view of *United States v. Lapowich*, 63 S. Ct. 914.

Changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1994—Pub. L. 103-322 substituted “fined under this title” for “fined not more than \$1,000”.