

(D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups;

(E) prevent attacks into neighboring countries;

(F) increase oversight over curriculum in madrassas, including closing madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and

(G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism;

(12) a detailed description of Pakistan's efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise;

(13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan's financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program;

(14) a detailed description of the extent to which funds obligated and expended pursuant to section 8422(b) of this title meet the requirements of such section; and

(15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.

(b) Government Accountability Office reports

(1) Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report

Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 8441(a) of this title, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains—

(A) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report;

(B) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this chapter;

(C) a detailed description of the expenditures made by Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section 2763 of this title (relating to the Foreign Military Financing program); and

(D) an assessment of the impact of the assistance on the security and stability of Pakistan.

(2) Certification report

Not later than 120 days after the date on which the President makes the certification described in section 8423(c) of this title for a fiscal year, the Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an independent analysis of the certification described in such

section and shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the results of the independent analysis.

(c) Submission

The Secretary of State may submit the reports required by this section in conjunction with other reports relating to Pakistan required under other provisions of law, including sections 1116 and 1117 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32; 123 Stat. 1906 and 1907).

(d) Appropriate congressional committees defined

In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(Pub. L. 111-73, title III, §302, Oct. 15, 2009, 123 Stat. 2077.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Sections 1116 and 1117 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32; 123 Stat. 1906 and 1907), referred to in subsec. (c), are not classified to the Code.

CHAPTER 92—COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVESTMENT

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SUBCHAPTER IV—GENERAL PROVISIONS

8551. General provisions.

§ 8501. Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The illicit nuclear activities of the Government of Iran, combined with its development of unconventional weapons and ballistic missiles and its support for international terrorism, represent a threat to the security of the United States, its strong ally Israel, and other allies of the United States around the world.

(2) The United States and other responsible countries have a vital interest in working together to prevent the Government of Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

(3) The International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly called attention to Iran's illicit nuclear activities and, as a result, the United Nations Security Council has adopted a range of sanctions designed to encourage the Government of Iran to suspend those activities and comply with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly known as the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty").

(4) The serious and urgent nature of the threat from Iran demands that the United States work together with its allies to do everything possible—diplomatically, politically, and economically—to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

(5) The United States and its major European allies, including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, have advocated that sanctions be strengthened should international diplomatic efforts fail to achieve verifiable suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment program and an end to its nuclear weapons program and other illicit nuclear activities.

(6) The Government of Iran continues to engage in serious, systematic, and ongoing violations of human rights, including suppression of freedom of expression and religious freedom, illegitimately prolonged detention, torture, and executions. Such violations have increased in the aftermath of the fraudulent presidential election in Iran on June 12, 2009.

(7) The Government of Iran has been unresponsive to President Obama's unprecedented and serious efforts at engagement, revealing that the Government of Iran is not interested in a diplomatic resolution, as made clear, for example, by the following:

(A) Iran's apparent rejection of the Tehran Research Reactor plan, generously offered by the United States and its partners, of potentially great benefit to the people of Iran, and endorsed by Iran's own negotiators in October 2009.

(B) Iran's ongoing clandestine nuclear program, as evidenced by its work on the secret

uranium enrichment facility at Qom, its subsequent refusal to cooperate fully with inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, and its announcement that it would build 10 new uranium enrichment facilities.

(C) Iran's official notification to the International Atomic Energy Agency that it would enrich uranium to the 20 percent level, followed soon thereafter by its providing to that Agency a laboratory result showing that Iran had indeed enriched some uranium to 19.8 percent.

(D) A February 18, 2010, report by the International Atomic Energy Agency expressing "concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. These alleged activities consist of a number of projects and sub-projects, covering nuclear and missile related aspects, run by military-related organizations."

(E) A May 31, 2010, report by the International Atomic Energy Agency expressing continuing strong concerns about Iran's lack of cooperation with the Agency's verification efforts and Iran's ongoing enrichment activities, which are contrary to the long-standing demands of the Agency and the United Nations Security Council.

(F) Iran's announcement in April 2010 that it had developed a new, faster generation of centrifuges for enriching uranium.

(G) Iran's ongoing arms exports to, and support for, terrorists in direct contravention of United Nations Security Council resolutions.

(H) Iran's July 31, 2009, arrest of 3 young citizens of the United States on spying charges.

(8) There is an increasing interest by State governments, local governments, educational institutions, and private institutions, business firms, and other investors to disassociate themselves from companies that conduct business activities in the energy sector of Iran, since such business activities may directly or indirectly support the efforts of the Government of Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.

(9) Black market proliferation networks continue to flourish in the Middle East, allowing countries like Iran to gain access to sensitive dual-use technologies.

(10) Economic sanctions imposed pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this Act, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), and other authorities available to the United States to impose economic sanctions to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, are necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States.

(Pub. L. 111-195, §2, July 1, 2010, 124 Stat. 1313.)

TERMINATION OF SECTION

For termination of section, see section 8551(a) of this title.