

(9) develop an institutional means for IAEA member nations to share intelligence material with the IAEA on possible safeguards violations without compromising national security or intelligence sources or methods;

(10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear facility or sensitive nuclear technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state to notify the IAEA prior to export and to require safeguards over that facility or technology, regardless of its destination; and

(11) seek agreement among the parties to the Treaty to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and to establish new limits on the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

(Pub. L. 103-236, title VIII, § 841, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 522.)

PROMOTION OF DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL SECURITY AND SAFETY BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Pub. L. 108-136, div. C, title XXXVI, § 3631, Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1825, provided that:

“(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INITIATION OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE IAEA AND THE OECD.—It is the sense of Congress that—

“(1) the United States should seek to initiate discussions between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for the purpose of exploring issues of nuclear and radiological security and safety, including the creation of new sources of revenue (including debt reduction) for states to provide nuclear security; and

“(2) the discussions referred to in paragraph (1) should also provide a forum to explore possible sources of funds in support of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

“(b) CONTINGENT REPORT.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the President shall, not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 24, 2003], submit to Congress a report on—

“(A) the efforts made by the United States to initiate the discussions described in subsection (a);

“(B) the results of those efforts; and

“(C) any plans for further discussions and the purposes of such discussions.

“(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply if no efforts referred to in paragraph (1)(A) have been made.”

### § 6322. IAEA internal reforms

In order to promote the early adoption of reforms in the implementation of the safeguards responsibilities of the IAEA, the Congress urges the President to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to—

(1) improve the access of the IAEA within nuclear facilities that are capable of producing, processing, or fabricating special nuclear material suitable for use in a nuclear explosive device;

(2)(A) facilitate the IAEA’s efforts to meet and to maintain its own goals for detecting the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment, giving particular attention to facilities in which there are bulk quantities of plutonium; and

(B) if it is not technically feasible for the IAEA to meet those detection goals in a par-

ticular facility, require the IAEA to declare publicly that it is unable to do so;

(3) enable the IAEA to issue fines for violations of safeguards procedures, to pay rewards for information on possible safeguards violations, and to establish a “hot line” for the reporting of such violations and other illicit uses of weapons-grade nuclear material;

(4) establish safeguards at facilities engaged in the manufacture of equipment or material that is especially designated or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material or, in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, of any nuclear explosive device;

(5) establish safeguards over nuclear research and development activities and facilities;

(6) implement special inspections of undeclared nuclear facilities, as provided for under existing safeguards procedures, and seek authority for the IAEA to conduct challenge inspections on demand at suspected nuclear sites;

(7) expand the scope of safeguards to include tritium, uranium concentrates, and nuclear waste containing special fissionable material, and increase the scope of such safeguards on heavy water;

(8) revise downward the IAEA’s official minimum amounts of nuclear material (“significant quantity”) needed to make a nuclear explosive device and establish these amounts as national rather than facility standards;

(9) expand the use of full-time resident IAEA inspectors at sensitive fuel cycle facilities;

(10) promote the use of near real time material accountancy in the conduct of safeguards at facilities that use, produce, or store significant quantities of special fissionable material;

(11) develop with other IAEA member nations an agreement on procedures to expedite approvals of visa applications by IAEA inspectors;

(12) provide the IAEA the additional funds, technical assistance, and political support necessary to carry out the goals set forth in this subsection;<sup>1</sup> and

(13) make public the annual safeguards implementation report of the IAEA, establishing a public registry of commodities in international nuclear commerce, including dual-use goods, and creating a public repository of current nuclear trade control laws, agreements, regulations, and enforcement and judicial actions by IAEA member nations.

(Pub. L. 103-236, title VIII, § 842, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 523.)

### § 6323. Reporting requirement

#### (a) Report required

The President shall, in the report required by section 3281(a) of this title, describe—

(1) the steps he has taken to implement sections 6321 and 6322 of this title, and

(2) the progress that has been made and the obstacles that have been encountered in seeking to meet the objectives set forth in sections 6321 and 6322 of this title.

<sup>1</sup> So in original. Probably should be “section;”.

**(b) Contents of report**

Each report under paragraph (1)<sup>1</sup> shall describe—

(1) the bilateral and multilateral initiatives that the President has taken during the period since April 30, 1994, in pursuit of each of the objectives set forth in sections 6321 and 6322 of this title;

(2) any obstacles that have been encountered in the pursuit of those initiatives;

(3) any additional initiatives that have been proposed by other countries or international organizations to strengthen the implementation of IAEA safeguards;

(4) all activities of the Federal Government in support of the objectives set forth in sections 6321 and 6322 of this title;

(5) any recommendations of the President on additional measures to enhance the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards; and

(6) any initiatives that the President plans to take in support of each of the objectives set forth in sections 6321 and 6322 of this title.

(Pub. L. 103-236, title VIII, § 843, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 524.)

**§ 6324. Definitions**

As used in this subchapter—

(1) the term “highly enriched uranium” means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the isotope U-235;

(2) the term “IAEA” means the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(3) the term “near real time material accountancy” means a method of accounting for the location, quantity, and disposition of special fissionable material at facilities that store or process such material, in which verification of peaceful use is continuously achieved by means of frequent physical inventories and the use of in-process instrumentation;

(4) the term “special fissionable material” has the meaning given that term by Article XX(1) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, done at the Headquarters of the United Nations on October 26, 1956;

(5) the term “the Treaty” means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968; and

(6) the terms “IAEA safeguards”, “non-nuclear-weapon state”, “nuclear explosive device”, and “special nuclear material” have the meanings given those terms in section 6305 of this title.

(Pub. L. 103-236, title VIII, § 844, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 524.)

**CHAPTER 73—INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM**

Sec.	
6401.	Findings; policy.
6402.	Definitions.

<sup>1</sup> So in original. Probably should be “subsection (a) of this section”.

Sec.	
	SUBCHAPTER I—DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTIVITIES
6411.	Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom.
6412.	Reports.
6413.	Establishment of religious freedom Internet site.
6414.	High-level contacts with nongovernmental organizations.
6415.	Programs and allocations of funds by United States missions abroad.
6416.	Equal access to United States missions abroad for conducting religious activities.
6417.	Prisoner lists and issue briefs on religious freedom concerns.
	SUBCHAPTER II—COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
6431.	Establishment and composition.
6432.	Duties of Commission.
6432a.	Powers of the Commission.
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6435.	Authorization of appropriations.
6435a.	Standards of conduct and disclosure.
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**SUBCHAPTER III—PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS****PART A—TARGETED RESPONSES TO VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ABROAD**

6441.	Presidential actions in response to violations of religious freedom.
6442.	Presidential actions in response to particularly severe violations of religious freedom.
6443.	Consultations.
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6461.	Exports of certain items used in particularly severe violations of religious freedom.
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6471.	Use of Annual Report.
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**SUBCHAPTER V—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS**

6481.	Business codes of conduct.
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**§ 6401. Findings; policy****(a) Findings**

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The right to freedom of religion undergirds the very origin and existence of the United States. Many of our Nation's founders fled religious persecution abroad, cherishing in their hearts and minds the ideal of religious freedom. They established in law, as a fundamental right and as a pillar of our Nation, the right to freedom of religion. From its birth to this day, the United States has prized this legacy of religious freedom and honored this heritage by standing for religious freedom and offering refuge to those suffering religious persecution.