

States Government may be used for the creation, operation, or support of the International Debt Management Authority specified in section 5331 of this title, without the express approval of the Congress through subsequent law, nor shall any expenses associated with such authority, either directly or indirectly, accrue to any United States person without the consent of such person. Except as restricted in the preceding sentence, the Secretary of the Treasury shall review all potential resources available to the multilateral financial institutions which could be used to support the creation of the International Debt Management Authority. In the course of this review, the Secretary shall direct—

(1) the United States Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund to determine the amount of, and alternative methods by which, gold stock of the Fund which, subject to action by its Board of Governors, could be pledged as collateral to obtain financing for the activities of the authority specified in section 5331 of this title; and

(2) the United States Executive Director to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to determine the amount of, and alternative methods by which, liquid assets controlled by such Bank and not currently committed to any loan program which, subject to action by its Board of Governors, could be pledged as collateral for obtaining financing for the activities of the authority specified in section 5331 of this title.

The Secretary of the Treasury shall include a report on the results of the review in the first report submitted under section 5331(c) of this title.

(b) Construction of section

Subsection (a) shall not be construed to affect any provision of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund or of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or any agreement entered into under either of such Agreements.

(Pub. L. 100-418, title III, §3112, Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1378.)

§ 5333. IMF-World Bank review

(a) IMF review

The United States Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund shall request the management of the International Monetary Fund to prepare a review and analysis of the debt burden of the developing countries, with particular attention to alternatives for dealing with the debt problem including new lending instruments, rescheduling and refinancing of existing debt, securitization and debt conversion techniques, discounted debt repurchases, and the International Debt Management Authority described in section 5331 of this title no later than 1 year after August 23, 1988.

(b) World Bank review

The United States Executive Director to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development shall request the management of the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-

velopment to prepare a review and analysis of the debt burden of the developing countries, with particular attention to alternatives for dealing with the debt problem including new lending instruments, rescheduling and refinancing of existing debt, securitization and debt conversion techniques, discounted debt repurchases, and the International Debt Management Authority described in section 5331 of this title no later than 1 year after August 23, 1988.

(Pub. L. 100-418, title III, §3113, Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1378.)

SUBCHAPTER III—PRIMARY DEALERS

§ 5341. Short title

This subchapter may be cited as the “Primary Dealers Act of 1988”.

(Pub. L. 100-418, title III, §3501, Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1386.)

§ 5342. Requirement of national treatment in underwriting government debt instruments

(a) Findings

The Congress finds that—

(1) United States companies can successfully compete in foreign markets if they are given fair access to such markets;

(2) a trade surplus in services could offset the deficit in manufactured goods and help lower the overall trade deficit significantly;

(3) in contrast to the barriers faced by United States firms in Japan, Japanese firms generally have enjoyed access to United States financial markets on the same terms as United States firms; and

(4) United States firms seeking to compete in Japan face or have faced a variety of discriminatory barriers effectively precluding such firms from fairly competing for Japanese business, including—

(A) limitations on membership on the Tokyo Stock Exchange;

(B) high fixed commission rates (ranging as high as 80 percent) which must be paid to members of the exchange by nonmembers for executing trades;

(C) unequal opportunities to participate in and act as lead manager for equity and bond underwritings;

(D) restrictions on access to automated teller machines;

(E) arbitrarily applied employment requirements for opening branch offices;

(F) long delays in processing applications and granting approvals for licenses to operate; and

(G) restrictions on foreign institutions’ participation in Ministry of Finance policy advisory councils.

(b) Designation of certain persons as primary dealers prohibited

(1) General rule

Neither the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the continuation of any prior designation of, any person of a foreign country as a primary