

under the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77a et seq.), and that it has not withdrawn.”

Subsecs. (g), (h). Pub. L. 107-204, §201(a), added subsecs. (g) and (h).

Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 107-204, §202, added subsec. (i).

Subsec. (j). Pub. L. 107-204, §203, added subsec. (j).

Subsec. (k). Pub. L. 107-204, §204, added subsec. (k).

Subsec. (l). Pub. L. 107-204, §206, added subsec. (l).

Subsec. (m). Pub. L. 107-204, §301, added subsec. (m).

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2010 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 111-203 effective 1 day after July 21, 2010, except as otherwise provided, see section 4 of Pub. L. 111-203, set out as an Effective Date note under section 5301 of Title 12, Banks and Banking.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Pub. L. 104-67, title III, §301(b), Dec. 22, 1995, 109 Stat. 764, provided that: “The amendment made by subsection (a) [enacting this section] shall apply to each annual report—

“(1) for any period beginning on or after January 1, 1996, with respect to any registrant that is required to file selected quarterly financial data pursuant to the rules or regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission; and

“(2) for any period beginning on or after January 1, 1997, with respect to any other registrant.”

CONSTRUCTION

Pub. L. 104-67, title II, §203, Dec. 22, 1995, 109 Stat. 762, provided that: “Nothing in this Act [see Short Title of 1995 Amendment note set out under section 78a of this title] or the amendments made by this Act shall be deemed to create or ratify any implied private right of action, or to prevent the Commission, by rule or regulation, from restricting or otherwise regulating private actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.]”

§ 78j-2. Position limits and position accountability for security-based swaps and large trader reporting

(a) Position limits

As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraud and manipulation, the Commission shall, by rule or regulation, as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, establish limits (including related hedge exemption provisions) on the size of positions in any security-based swap that may be held by any person. In establishing such limits, the Commission may require any person to aggregate positions in—

(1) any security-based swap and any security or loan or group of securities or loans on which such security-based swap is based, which such security-based swap references, or to which such security-based swap is related as described in paragraph (68) of section 78c(a) of this title, and any other instrument relating to such security or loan or group or index of securities or loans; or

(2) any security-based swap and—

(A) any security or group or index of securities, the price, yield, value, or volatility of which, or of which any interest therein, is the basis for a material term of such security-based swap as described in paragraph (68) of section 78c(a) of this title; and

(B) any other instrument relating to the same security or group or index of securities described under subparagraph (A).

(b) Exemptions

The Commission, by rule, regulation, or order, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt

any person or class of persons, any security-based swap or class of security-based swaps, or any transaction or class of transactions from any requirement the Commission may establish under this section with respect to position limits.

(c) SRO rules

(1) In general

As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraud or manipulation, the Commission, by rule, regulation, or order, as necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter, may direct a self-regulatory organization—

(A) to adopt rules regarding the size of positions in any security-based swap that may be held by—

(i) any member of such self-regulatory organization; or

(ii) any person for whom a member of such self-regulatory organization effects transactions in such security-based swap; and

(B) to adopt rules reasonably designed to ensure compliance with requirements prescribed by the Commission under this subsection.

(2) Requirement to aggregate positions

In establishing the limits under paragraph (1), the self-regulatory organization may require such member or person to aggregate positions in—

(A) any security-based swap and any security or loan or group or narrow-based security index of securities or loans on which such security-based swap is based, which such security-based swap references, or to which such security-based swap is related as described in section 78c(a)(68) of this title, and any other instrument relating to such security or loan or group or narrow-based security index of securities or loans; or

(B)(i) any security-based swap; and

(ii) any security-based swap and any other instrument relating to the same security or group or narrow-based security index of securities.

(d) Large trader reporting

The Commission, by rule or regulation, may require any person that effects transactions for such person’s own account or the account of others in any securities-based swap or uncleared security-based swap and any security or loan or group or narrow-based security index of securities or loans as set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) under this section to report such information as the Commission may prescribe regarding any position or positions in any security-based swap or uncleared security-based swap and any security or loan or group or narrow-based security index of securities or loans and any other instrument relating to such security or loan or group or narrow-based security index of securities or loans as set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) under this section.

(June 6, 1934, ch. 404, title I, §10B, as added Pub. L. 111-203, title VII, §763(h), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 1778.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

This chapter, referred to in subsec. (c)(1), was in the original “this title”. See References in Text note set out under section 78a of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section effective on the later of 360 days after July 21, 2010, or, to the extent a provision of subtitle B (§§ 761-774) of title VII of Pub. L. 111-203 requires a rule-making, not less than 60 days after publication of the final rule or regulation implementing such provision of subtitle B, see section 774 of Pub. L. 111-203, set out as an Effective Date of 2010 Amendment note under section 77b of this title.

§ 78j-3. Compensation committees**(a) Independence of compensation committees****(1) Listing standards**

The Commission shall, by rule, direct the national securities exchanges and national securities associations to prohibit the listing of any equity security of an issuer, other than an issuer that is a controlled company, limited partnership, company in bankruptcy proceedings, open-ended management investment company that is registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.], or a foreign private issuer that provides annual disclosures to shareholders of the reasons that the foreign private issuer does not have an independent compensation committee, that does not comply with the requirements of this subsection.

(2) Independence of compensation committees

The rules of the Commission under paragraph (1) shall require that each member of the compensation committee of the board of directors of an issuer be—

- (A) a member of the board of directors of the issuer; and
- (B) independent.

(3) Independence

The rules of the Commission under paragraph (1) shall require that, in determining the definition of the term “independence” for purposes of paragraph (2), the national securities exchanges and the national securities associations shall consider relevant factors, including—

- (A) the source of compensation of a member of the board of directors of an issuer, including any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee paid by the issuer to such member of the board of directors; and
- (B) whether a member of the board of directors of an issuer is affiliated with the issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer, or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the issuer.

(4) Exemption authority

The rules of the Commission under paragraph (1) shall permit a national securities exchange or a national securities association to exempt a particular relationship from the requirements of paragraph (2), with respect to the members of a compensation committee, as the national securities exchange or national securities association determines is appropriate, taking into consideration the size of an issuer and any other relevant factors.

(b) Independence of compensation consultants and other compensation committee advisers**(1) In general**

The compensation committee of an issuer may only select a compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser to the compensation committee after taking into consideration the factors identified by the Commission under paragraph (2).

(2) Rules

The Commission shall identify factors that affect the independence of a compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser to a compensation committee of an issuer. Such factors shall be competitively neutral among categories of consultants, legal counsel, or other advisers and preserve the ability of compensation committees to retain the services of members of any such category, and shall include—

(A) the provision of other services to the issuer by the person that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser;

(B) the amount of fees received from the issuer by the person that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser, as a percentage of the total revenue of the person that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser;

(C) the policies and procedures of the person that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest;

(D) any business or personal relationship of the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser with a member of the compensation committee; and

(E) any stock of the issuer owned by the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser.

(c) Compensation committee authority relating to compensation consultants**(1) Authority to retain compensation consultant****(A) In general**

The compensation committee of an issuer, in its capacity as a committee of the board of directors, may, in its sole discretion, retain or obtain the advice of a compensation consultant.

(B) Direct responsibility of compensation committee

The compensation committee of an issuer shall be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of a compensation consultant.

(C) Rule of construction

This paragraph may not be construed—

(i) to require the compensation committee to implement or act consistently with the advice or recommendations of the compensation consultant; or

(ii) to affect the ability or obligation of a compensation committee to exercise its own judgment in fulfillment of the duties of the compensation committee.