

used to transfer the functions, missions, or activities, and associated civil service and contractor positions, from any NASA facility without authorization by the Congress to implement the proposed strategy. The Administrator shall preserve the critical skills and competencies in place at NASA centers prior to October 11, 2010, in order to facilitate timely implementation of the requirements of this chapter and to minimize disruption to the workforce. The Administrator may not implement any reduction-in-force or other involuntary separations of permanent, non-Senior-Executive-Service, civil servant employees before September 30, 2013, except for cause on charges of misconduct, delinquency, or inefficiency.

(Pub. L. 111-267, title XI, § 1105, Oct. 11, 2010, 124 Stat. 2840.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 1103, referred to in text, is Pub. L. 111-267, title XI, § 1103, Oct. 11, 2010, 124 Stat. 2840, which is not classified to the Code.

This Act, referred to in text, is Pub. L. 111-267, Oct. 11, 2010, 124 Stat. 2805, known as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010, which enacted this chapter (§18301 et seq.) and various other provisions, including provisions authorizing appropriations, which were not classified to the Code. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 18301 of this title and Tables.

SUBCHAPTER XI—OTHER MATTERS

§ 18441. National and international orbital debris mitigation

(a) Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) A national and international effort is needed to develop a coordinated approach towards the prevention, negation, and removal of orbital debris.

(2) The guidelines issued by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee provide a consensus understanding of 10 national space agencies (including NASA) plus the European Space Agency on the necessity of mitigating the creation of space debris and measures for doing so. NASA's participation on the Committee should be robust, and NASA should urge other space-relevant Federal agencies (including the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce) to work to ensure that their counterpart agencies in foreign governments are aware of these national commitments and the importance in which the United States holds them.

(3) Key components of such an approach should include—

(A) a process for debris prevention through agreements regarding spacecraft design, operations, and end-of-life disposition plans to minimize orbiting vehicles or elements which are nonfunctional;

(B) the development of a robust Space Situational Awareness network that can identify potential collisions and provide sufficient trajectory and orbital data to enable avoidance maneuvers;

(C) the interagency development of an overall strategy for review by the President,

with recommendations for proposed international collaborative efforts to address this challenge.

(b) International discussion

(1) In general

The Administrator shall, in consultation with such other departments and agencies of the Federal Government as the Administrator considers appropriate, continue and strengthen discussions with the representatives of other space-faring countries, within the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee and elsewhere, to deal with this orbital debris mitigation.

(2) Interagency effort

For purposes of carrying out this subsection, the Director of OSTP, in coordination with the Director of the National Security Council and using the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology coordinating mechanism, shall develop an overall strategy for review by the President, with recommendations for proposed international collaborative efforts to address this challenge.

(Pub. L. 111-267, title XII, § 1202, Oct. 11, 2010, 124 Stat. 2841.)

§ 18442. Reports on program and cost assessment and control assessment

(a) Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The adherence of NASA to program cost and schedule targets and discipline across NASA programs remains a concern.

(2) The James Webb Space Telescope has exceeded its cost estimate.

(3) In 2007 the Government Accountability Office issued a report on NASA's high risk acquisition performance.

(4) In response, NASA prepared a corrective action plan two years ago.

(b) Reports

(1) Reports required

Not later than 90 days after October 11, 2010, and not later than April 30 of each year thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the implementation during the preceding year for the corrective action plan referred to in subsection (a)(4).

(2) Elements

Each report under this subsection shall set forth, for the year covered by such report, the following:

(A) A description of each NASA program that has exceeded its cost baseline by 15 percent or more or is more than 2 years behind its projected development schedule.

(B) For each program specified under subparagraph (A), a plan for such decrease in scope or requirements, or other measures, to be undertaken to control cost and schedule, including any cost monitoring or corrective actions undertaken pursuant to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-155),¹ and the amendments made by that Act.

¹ See References in Text note below.