

Authority established or designated pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 4, of the Convention. (Pub. L. 105–85, div. A, title XIII, § 1303, Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 1951.)

CODIFICATION

Section was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, and not as part of Pub. L. 91–121, title IV, § 409, Nov. 19, 1969, 83 Stat. 209, which comprises this chapter.

§ 1526. Effective use of resources for non-proliferation programs

(a) Prohibition

Except as provided in subsection (b), no assistance may be provided by the United States Government to any person who is involved in the research, development, design, testing, or evaluation of chemical or biological weapons for offensive purposes.

(b) Exception

The prohibition contained in subsection (a) shall not apply to any activity conducted pursuant to title V of the National Security Act of 1947 [50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.].

(Pub. L. 106–113, div. B, § 1000(a)(7) [div. B, title XI, § 1132], Nov. 29, 1999, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A–493).

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The National Security Act of 1947, referred to in subsection (b), is act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495, which was formerly classified principally to chapter 15 (§ 401 et seq.) of this title, prior to editorial reclassification in chapter 44 (§ 3001 et seq.) of this title. Title V of the Act is now classified generally to subchapter III (§ 3091 et seq.) of chapter 44 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.

CODIFICATION

Section was enacted as part of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1999, and also as part of the Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Security Assistance Act of 1999, and the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years, 2000 and 2001, and not as part of Pub. L. 91–121, title IV, § 409, Nov. 19, 1969, 83 Stat. 209, which comprises this chapter.

§ 1527. Improved biosafety for handling of select agents and toxins

(a) Quality control and quality assurance program

The Secretary of Defense, acting through the executive agent for the biological select agent and toxin biosafety program of the Department of Defense, shall carry out a program to implement certain quality control and quality assurance measures at each covered facility.

(b) Quality control and quality assurance measures

Subject to subsection (c), the quality control and quality assurance measures implemented at each covered facility under subsection (a) shall include the following:

- (1) Designation of an external manager to oversee quality assurance and quality control.
- (2) Environmental sampling and inspection.
- (3) Production procedures that prohibit operations where live biological select agents and toxins are used in the same laboratory where viability testing is conducted.

(4) Production procedures that prohibit work on multiple organisms or multiple strains of one organism within the same biosafety cabinet.

(5) A video surveillance program that uses video monitoring as a tool to improve laboratory practices in accordance with regulatory requirements.

(6) Formal, recurring data reviews of production in an effort to identify data trends and nonconformance issues before such issues affect end products.

(7) Validated protocols for production processes to ensure that process deviations are adequately vetted prior to implementation.

(8) Maintenance and calibration procedures and schedules for all tools, equipment, and irradiators.

(c) Waiver

In carrying out the program under subsection (a), the Secretary may waive any of the quality control and quality assurance measures required under subsection (b) in the interest of national defense.

(d) Study and report required

(1) Study

The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a study to evaluate—

(A) the feasibility of consolidating covered facilities within a unified command to minimize risk;

(B) opportunities to partner with industry for the production of biological select agents and toxins and related services in lieu of maintaining such capabilities within the Department of the Army; and

(C) whether operations under the biological select agent and toxin production program should be transferred to another government or commercial laboratory that may be better suited to execute production for non-Department of Defense customers.

(2) Report

Not later than February 1, 2017, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the results of the study under paragraph (1).

(e) Comptroller General review

Not later than September 1, 2017, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes the following:

(1) A review of—

(A) the actions taken by the Department of Defense to address the findings and recommendations of the report of the Department of the Army titled “Individual and Institutional Accountability for the Shipment of Viable *Bacillus Anthracis* from Dugway Proving Grounds”, dated December 15, 2015, including any actions taken to address the culture of complacency in the biological select agent and toxin production program identified in such report; and

(B) the progress of the Secretary in carrying out the program under subsection (a).

(2) An analysis of the study and report under subsection (d).