

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

(Pub. L. 115-44, title I, §102, Aug. 2, 2017, 131 Stat. 888.)

SHORT TITLE

Pub. L. 115-44, §1(a), Aug. 2, 2017, 131 Stat. 886, provided that: “This Act [enacting this chapter, chapter 102 of this title, sections 8909, 8910, 9221a, 9225, 9241a, and 9241b of this title, and section 1232c of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters, amending sections 2708, 8901, 8907, 8908, 8923, 8924, 9202, 9214, 9223, 9228, and 9241 of this title, section 5326 of Title 31, Money and Finance, sections 1223 and 1232 of Title 33, and section 3021 of Title 50, War and National Defense, repealing section 9225 of this title, and enacting provisions set out as notes under this section, sections 9201, 9202, 9214, 9241, and 9501 of this title, and section 3021 of Title 50] may be cited as the ‘Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.’”

Pub. L. 115-44, title I, §101, Aug. 2, 2017, 131 Stat. 888, provided that: “This title [enacting this chapter] may be cited as the ‘Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017.’”

§ 9402. Regional strategy for countering conventional and asymmetric Iranian threats in the Middle East and North Africa

(a) In general

Not later than 180 days after August 2, 2017, and every 2 years thereafter, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a strategy for deterring conventional and asymmetric Iranian activities and threats that directly threaten the United States and key allies in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond.

(b) Elements

The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include at a minimum the following:

(1) A summary of the near- and long-term United States objectives, plans, and means for countering Iran’s destabilizing activities, including identification of countries that share the objective of countering Iran’s destabilizing activities.

(2) A summary of the capabilities and contributions of individual countries to shared efforts to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities, and a summary of additional actions or contributions that each country could take to further contribute.

(3) An assessment of Iran’s conventional force capabilities and an assessment of Iran’s plans to upgrade its conventional force capabilities, including its acquisition, development, and deployment of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, unmanned aerial vehicles, and maritime offensive and anti-access or area denial capabilities.

(4) An assessment of Iran’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities and an assessment of Iranian plans to upgrade its chemical or biological weapons capabilities.

(5) An assessment of Iran’s asymmetric activities in the region, including—

(A) the size, capabilities, and activities of the IRGC, including the Quds Force;

(B) the size, capabilities, and activities of Iran’s cyber operations;

(C) the types and amount of support, including funding, lethal and nonlethal contributions, and training, provided to Hezbollah, Hamas, special groups in Iraq, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Houthi fighters in Yemen, and other violent groups across the Middle East; and

(D) the scope and objectives of Iran’s information operations and use of propaganda.

(6) A summary of United States actions, unilaterally and in cooperation with foreign governments, to counter destabilizing Iranian activities, including—

(A) interdiction of Iranian lethal arms bound for groups designated as foreign terrorist organizations under section 1189 of title 8;

(B) Iran’s interference in international commercial shipping lanes;

(C) attempts by Iran to undermine or subvert internationally recognized governments in the Middle East region; and

(D) Iran’s support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, including—

(i) financial assistance, military equipment and personnel, and other support provided to that regime; and

(ii) support and direction to other armed actors that are not Syrian or Iranian and are acting on behalf of that regime.

(c) Form of strategy

The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) Appropriate congressional committees and leadership defined

In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees and leadership” means—

(1) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(Pub. L. 115-44, title I, §103, Aug. 2, 2017, 131 Stat. 889.)

§ 9403. Imposition of additional sanctions in response to Iran’s ballistic missile program

(a) Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State should continue to implement Executive Order No. 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of weapons of mass destruction delivery system proliferators and their supporters).

(b) Imposition of sanctions

The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any per-