

of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance does not exist.

(j) Scope of application

This section shall apply with respect to prohibited activities which occur on or after the date this subchapter takes effect.

(Pub. L. 103-236, title VIII, § 824, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 512; Pub. L. 104-164, title I, § 157(b), July 21, 1996, 110 Stat. 1440.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

For the date this subchapter takes effect, referred to in subsec. (j), as 60 days after Apr. 30, 1994, see section 831 of Pub. L. 103-236, set out as an Effective Date note under section 6301 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1996—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 104-164, § 157(b)(1), struck out “in writing after opportunity for a hearing on the record” after “If the President determines.”

Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 104-164, § 157(b)(2), (3), redesignated subsec. (f) as (e) and struck out heading and text of former subsec. (e). Text read as follows: “Any determination of the President under subsection (c) of this section shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with chapter 7 of part I of title 5.”

Subsecs. (f) to (k). Pub. L. 104-164, § 157(b)(3), redesignated subsecs. (g) to (k) as (f) to (j), respectively. Former subsec. (f) redesignated (e).

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section effective 60 days after Apr. 30, 1994, see section 831 of Pub. L. 103-236, set out as a note under section 6301 of this title.

§ 6304. Reporting on demarches

(1) It is the sense of the Congress that the Department of State should, in the course of implementing its reporting responsibilities under section 3282(c) of this title, include a summary of demarches that the United States has issued or received from foreign governments with respect to activities which are of significance from the proliferation standpoint.

(2) For purposes of this section, the term “demarche” means any official communication by one government to another, by written or oral means, intended by the originating government to express—

(A) a concern over a past, present, or possible future action or activity of the recipient government, or of a person within the jurisdiction of that government, contributing to the global spread of unsafeguarded special nuclear material or of nuclear explosive devices;

(B) a request for the recipient government to counter such action or activity; or

(C) both the concern and request described in subparagraphs (A) and (B).

(Pub. L. 103-236, title VIII, § 828(b), Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 520.)

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section effective 60 days after Apr. 30, 1994, see section 831 of Pub. L. 103-236, set out as a note under section 6301 of this title.

§ 6305. Definitions

For purposes of this subchapter—

(1) the term “foreign person” means—

(A) an individual who is not a citizen of the United States or an alien admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) a corporation, partnership, or other nongovernment entity which is created or organized under the laws of a foreign country or which has its principal place of business outside the United States;

(2) the term “goods or technology” means—
(A) nuclear materials and equipment and sensitive nuclear technology (as such terms are defined in section 3203 of this title), all export items designated by the President pursuant to section 2139a(c) of title 42, and all technical assistance requiring authorization under section 2077(b) of title 42, and

(B) in the case of exports from a country other than the United States, any goods or technology that, if exported from the United States, would be goods or technology described in subparagraph (A);

(3) the term “IAEA safeguards” means the safeguards set forth in an agreement between a country and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as authorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(4) the term “nuclear explosive device” means any device, whether assembled or disassembled, that is designed to produce an instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that is greater than the amount of energy that would be released from the detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT);

(5) the term “non-nuclear-weapon state” means any country which is not a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by Article IX (3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968;

(6) the term “special nuclear material” has the meaning given that term in section 2014(aa) of title 42;

(7) the term “United States person” means—

(A) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or an alien admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) a corporation, partnership, or other nongovernment entity which is not a foreign person; and

(8) the term “unsafeguarded special nuclear material” means special nuclear material which is held in violation of IAEA safeguards or not subject to IAEA safeguards (excluding any quantity of material that could, if it were exported from the United States, be exported under a general license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).

(Pub. L. 103-236, title VIII, § 830, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 521.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

This subchapter, referred to in text, was in the original a reference to this part, meaning part B of title VIII of Pub. L. 103-236, which is classified principally to this subchapter. For complete classification of part B to the Code, see Effective Date note set out under section 6301 of this title and Tables.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section effective 60 days after Apr. 30, 1994, see section 831 of Pub. L. 103-236, set out as a note under section 6301 of this title.

SUBCHAPTER II—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

§ 6321. Bilateral and multilateral initiatives

It is the sense of the Congress that in order to maintain and enhance international confidence in the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards and in other multilateral undertakings to halt the global proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States should seek to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to—

(1) build international support for the principle that nuclear supply relationships must require purchasing nations to agree to full-scope international safeguards;

(2) encourage each nuclear-weapon state within the meaning of the Treaty to undertake a comprehensive review of its own procedures for declassifying information relating to the design or production of nuclear explosive devices and to investigate any measures that would reduce the risk of such information contributing to nuclear weapons proliferation;

(3) encourage the deferral of efforts to produce weapons-grade nuclear material for large-scale commercial uses until such time as safeguards are developed that can detect, on a timely and reliable basis, the diversion of significant quantities of such material for nuclear explosive purposes;

(4) pursue greater financial support for the implementation and improvement of safeguards from all IAEA member nations with significant nuclear programs, particularly from those nations that are currently using or planning to use weapons-grade nuclear material for commercial purposes;

(5) arrange for the timely payment of annual financial contributions by all members of the IAEA, including the United States;

(6) pursue the elimination of international commerce in highly enriched uranium for use in research reactors while encouraging multilateral cooperation to develop and to use low-enriched alternative nuclear fuels;

(7) oppose efforts by non-nuclear-weapon states to develop or use unsafeguarded nuclear fuels for purposes of naval propulsion;

(8) pursue an international open skies arrangement that would authorize the IAEA to operate surveillance aircraft and would facilitate IAEA access to satellite information for safeguards verification purposes;

(9) develop an institutional means for IAEA member nations to share intelligence material with the IAEA on possible safeguards violations without compromising national security or intelligence sources or methods;

(10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear facility or sensitive nuclear technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state to notify the IAEA prior to export and to require safeguards over that facility or technology, regardless of its destination; and

(11) seek agreement among the parties to the Treaty to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and to establish new limits on the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

(Pub. L. 103-236, title VIII, §841, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 522.)

PROMOTION OF DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL SECURITY AND SAFETY BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Pub. L. 108-136, div. C, title XXXVI, §3631, Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1825, provided that:

“(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INITIATION OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE IAEA AND THE OECD.—It is the sense of Congress that—

“(1) the United States should seek to initiate discussions between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for the purpose of exploring issues of nuclear and radiological security and safety, including the creation of new sources of revenue (including debt reduction) for states to provide nuclear security; and

“(2) the discussions referred to in paragraph (1) should also provide a forum to explore possible sources of funds in support of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

“(b) CONTINGENT REPORT.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the President shall, not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 24, 2003], submit to Congress a report on—

“(A) the efforts made by the United States to initiate the discussions described in subsection (a);

“(B) the results of those efforts; and

“(C) any plans for further discussions and the purposes of such discussions.

“(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply if no efforts referred to in paragraph (1)(A) have been made.”

§ 6322. IAEA internal reforms

In order to promote the early adoption of reforms in the implementation of the safeguards responsibilities of the IAEA, the Congress urges the President to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to—

(1) improve the access of the IAEA within nuclear facilities that are capable of producing, processing, or fabricating special nuclear material suitable for use in a nuclear explosive device;

(2)(A) facilitate the IAEA's efforts to meet and to maintain its own goals for detecting the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment, giving particular attention to facilities in which there are bulk quantities of plutonium; and

(B) if it is not technically feasible for the IAEA to meet those detection goals in a particular facility, require the IAEA to declare publicly that it is unable to do so;

(3) enable the IAEA to issue fines for violations of safeguards procedures, to pay rewards for information on possible safeguards violations, and to establish a “hot line” for the reporting of such violations and other illicit uses of weapons-grade nuclear material;

(4) establish safeguards at facilities engaged in the manufacture of equipment or material that is especially designated or prepared for