

ness at the places fixed by this chapter shall be determined by the rules or orders of the court. Such rules or orders may provide that at one or more of such places the court shall be in continuous session for such purposes on all business days throughout the year. At other places a session of the court shall continue for such purposes until terminated by order of final adjournment or by commencement of the next regular session at the same place.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 897; Pub. L. 88-139, §1, Oct. 16, 1963, 77 Stat. 248.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

The purpose of this section is to remove all doubt as to whether the mere beginning of a new term at one place ends a prior term begun at another place. As revised, it conforms to a uniform course of judicial decisions. See *U.S. v. Perlstein*, 39 F.Supp. 965, 968 (D.C.N.J. 1941), and cases cited.

AMENDMENTS

1963—Pub. L. 88-139 substituted provisions requiring the times for commencing regular sessions of the district court to be determined by the rules or orders of the court, authorizing such rules or orders to provide that at one or more of the places fixed by this chapter, the court shall be in continuous session on all business days throughout the year, and that at other places, a session continues until terminated by order of final adjournment or by commencement of the next regular session at the same place, for provisions that a term continues until terminated by order of final adjournment or by commencement of the next term at the same place, in the text, and “Times for holding regular sessions” for “Term continued until terminated” in section catchline.

§ 140. Adjournment

(a) Any district court may, by order made anywhere within its district, adjourn or, with the consent of the judicial council of the circuit, pretermite any regular session of court for insufficient business or other good cause.

(b) If the judge of a district court is unable to attend and unable to make an order of adjournment, the clerk may adjourn the court to the next regular session or to any earlier day which he may determine.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 897; Pub. L. 88-139, §1, Oct. 16, 1963, 77 Stat. 248.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§16, 146, 182 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§12, 73, 101, 36 Stat. 1088, 1108, 1122; June 12, 1916, ch. 143, 39 Stat. 225; Feb. 20, 1917, ch. 102, 39 Stat. 927; June 13, 1918, ch. 98, 40 Stat. 604; Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 54, 40 Stat. 1184; May 29, 1924, ch. 209, 43 Stat. 243; June 5, 1924, ch. 259, 43 Stat. 387; Jan. 10, 1925, chs. 68, 69, 43 Stat. 730, 731; Feb. 16, 1925, ch. 233, §1, 43 Stat. 945; May 7, 1926, ch. 255, 44 Stat. 408; Apr. 21, 1928, ch. 395, 45 Stat. 440; Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 539, 45 Stat. 1518; June 28, 1930, ch. 714, 46 Stat. 829; May 13, 1936, ch. 386, 49 Stat. 1271; Aug. 12, 1937, ch. 595, 50 Stat. 625).

Section consolidates section 16 with the third sentence of section 146, and the final proviso in the third paragraph of section 182, all of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.

Said section 16 of title 28 provided for adjournment by the marshal, or clerk, on written order of the judge, in case of inability of the district judge to attend at the commencement of any regular, adjourned or special term, or any time during such term. Said sections 146 and 182 thereof, related to the district courts of Colorado and Oklahoma, only, and contained special provi-

sions for adjournment. Subsection (b) omits the requirement of written order where the judge is unable to make such order.

The revised section broadens these provisions, and vests discretionary power in the court, by order made anywhere within the district, to adjourn any term of court “for insufficient business or other good cause.” To establish uniformity, the special provisions relating to Colorado and Oklahoma were omitted.

Other provisions of said sections 146 and 182 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., are incorporated in sections 85 and 116 of this title.

The provision of subsection (a) authorizing the district court, with the consent of the judicial council of the circuit, to pretermite any term of court for insufficient business or other good cause, is inserted to obviate the expense and inconvenience of convening and adjourning a term for which no need exists.

AMENDMENTS

1963—Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub. L. 88-139 substituted “session” for “term”.

§ 141. Special sessions; places; notice

(a)(1) Special sessions of the district court may be held at such places in the district as the nature of the business may require, and upon such notice as the court orders.

(2) Any business may be transacted at a special session which might be transacted at a regular session.

(b)(1) Special sessions of the district court may be held at such places within the United States outside the district as the nature of the business may require and upon such notice as the court orders, upon a finding by either the chief judge of the district court (or, if the chief judge is unavailable, the most senior available active judge of the district court) or the judicial council of the circuit that, because of emergency conditions, no location within the district is reasonably available where such special sessions could be held.

(2) Pursuant to this subsection, any business which may be transacted at a regular session of a district court may be transacted at a special session conducted outside the district, except that a criminal trial may not be conducted at a special session outside the State in which the crime has been committed unless the defendant consents to such a criminal trial.

(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any case in which special sessions are conducted pursuant to this section, the district court may summon jurors—

(A) in civil proceedings, from any part of the district in which the court ordinarily conducts business or the district in which it is holding a special session; and

(B) in criminal trials, from any part of the district in which the crime has been committed and, if the defendant so consents, from any district in which the court is conducting business pursuant to this section.

(4) If a district court issues an order exercising its authority under paragraph (1), the court—

(A) through the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, shall—

(i) send notice of such order, including the reasons for the issuance of such order, to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and

(ii) not later than 180 days after the expiration of such court order submit a brief report to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives describing the impact of such order, including—

(I) the reasons for the issuance of such order;

(II) the duration of such order;

(III) the impact of such order on litigants; and

(IV) the costs to the judiciary resulting from such order; and

(B) shall provide reasonable notice to the United States Marshals Service before the commencement of any special session held pursuant to such order.

(5) If a district court issues an order exercising its authority under paragraph (1), the court shall direct the United States marshal of the district where the court is meeting to furnish transportation and subsistence to the same extent as that provided in sections 4282 and 4285 of title 18.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 897; Pub. L. 88-139, §1, Oct. 16, 1963, 77 Stat. 248; Pub. L. 109-63, §2(b), Sept. 9, 2005, 119 Stat. 1994; Pub. L. 109-162, title XI, §1198(a), Jan. 5, 2006, 119 Stat. 3132.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §15 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §11, 36 Stat. 1089).

Section was rewritten to include provision that notice of special terms should conform to rules approved by the judicial council of the circuit, thus insuring a uniform practice among the courts for convening special terms.

Changes of phraseology were made.

AMENDMENTS

2006—Subsec. (b)(5). Pub. L. 109-162 added par. (5).

2005—Pub. L. 109-63 designated first and second undesignated pars. as pars. (1) and (2), respectively, of subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

1963—Pub. L. 88-139 substituted “sessions” for “terms” and “session” for “term” wherever appearing in text and section catchline, and struck out “pursuant to rules approved by the judicial council of the circuit” after “court orders” in text.

[§ 142. Repealed. Pub. L. 97-164, title I, § 115(c)(3), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 32]

Section, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 898; Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. 87-764, 76 Stat. 762; Nov. 19, 1977, Pub. L. 95-196, 91 Stat. 1420, related to the providing of accommodations at places for holding court. See section 462 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPEAL

Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97-164, set out as an Effective Date of 1982 Amendment note under section 171 of this title.

WAIVER OF LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS

The limitations and restrictions contained in this section prior to its repeal were waived with respect to the holding of court at certain places by the following Acts:

Pub. L. 87-833, Oct. 15, 1962, 76 Stat. 959, related to Akron, Ohio.

Pub. L. 87-699, Sept. 25, 1962, 76 Stat. 598, related to Richland, Washington.

Pub. L. 87-562, §4, July 30, 1962, 76 Stat. 248, related to Fort Myers, Saint Petersburg, Fort Pierce, and West Palm Beach, Florida.

Pub. L. 87-560, July 27, 1962, 76 Stat. 247, related to Marshall, Texas.

Pub. L. 87-559, July 27, 1962, 76 Stat. 246, related to Decatur, Alabama.

Pub. L. 87-553, July 27, 1962, 76 Stat. 222, related to Winchester, Tennessee.

Pub. L. 87-551, July 27, 1962, 76 Stat. 221, related to Bridgeport, Connecticut.

Pub. L. 87-337, Oct. 3, 1961, 75 Stat. 750, related to Lafayette, Louisiana.

Pub. L. 87-36, §3(g), May 19, 1961, 75 Stat. 83, related to Kalamazoo, Michigan; Fayetteville, North Carolina; and Dyersburg, Tennessee.

Pub. L. 86-366, Sept. 22, 1959, 73 Stat. 647, related to Durant, Oklahoma.

Act July 20, 1956, ch. 657, 70 Stat. 594, related to Bryson City, North Carolina.

Act Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1006, 64 Stat. 982, related to Klamath Falls, Oregon.

Act Aug. 21, 1950, ch. 767, 64 Stat. 469, related to Newnan, Georgia.

Act Aug. 10, 1950, ch. 675, §2, 64 Stat. 438, related to Rock Island, Illinois.

Act Oct. 26, 1949, ch. 744, 63 Stat. 923, related to Thomasville, Georgia.

Act Oct. 26, 1949, ch. 740, 63 Stat. 921, related to Brunswick, Georgia.

§ 143. Vacant judgeship as affecting proceedings

When the office of a district judge becomes vacant, all pending process, pleadings and proceedings shall, when necessary, be continued by the clerk until a judge is appointed or designated to hold such court.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 898.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §26 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §22, 36 Stat. 1090).

The last clause of section 26 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940, ed., prescribing the powers of a designated judge was omitted as covered by section 296 of this title.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

§ 144. Bias or prejudice of judge

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 898; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §65, 63 Stat. 99.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §25 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §21, 36 Stat. 1090).

The provision that the same procedure shall be had when the presiding judge disqualifies himself was omitted as unnecessary. (See section 291 et seq. and section 455 of this title.)