

without intent to retain possession of such property;

(3) the destruction of spoils of war by troops in the field;

(4) the return of spoils of war to previous owners from whom such property had been seized by enemy forces; or

(5) minor articles of personal property which have lawfully become the property of individual members of the armed forces as war trophies pursuant to public written authorization from the Department of Defense.

(Pub. L. 103-236, title V, §556, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 483.)

CHAPTER 40—DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

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- 2366. Repealed.
- 2367. Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles.
- 2368. Annual reports on the proliferation of missiles and essential components of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons.
- 2369. Repealed.
- 2370. Notification of Committees on Armed Services with respect to certain nonproliferation and proliferation activities.
- 2371. Repealed.

§ 2301. Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies are increasingly available from worldwide sources. Technical information relating to such weapons is readily available on the Internet, and raw materials for chemical, biological, and radiological weapons are widely available for legitimate commercial purposes.

(2) The former Soviet Union produced and maintained a vast array of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

(3) Many of the states of the former Soviet Union retain the facilities, materials, and technologies capable of producing additional quantities of weapons of mass destruction.

(4) The disintegration of the former Soviet Union was accompanied by disruptions of command and control systems, deficiencies in accountability for weapons, weapons-related materials and technologies, economic hardships, and significant gaps in border control among the states of the former Soviet Union. The problems of organized crime and corruption in the states of the former Soviet Union increase the potential for proliferation of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons and related materials.

(5) The conditions described in paragraph (4) have substantially increased the ability of potentially hostile nations, terrorist groups, and individuals to acquire weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies from within the states of the former Soviet Union and from unemployed scientists who worked on those programs.

(6) As a result of such conditions, the capability of potentially hostile nations and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons is greater than at any time in history.