- (D) such changes to the Center's mission to fully capture broader unlawful activities that intersect with, complement, or support information warfare tactics; and
- (2) not less frequently than once each year, submit to the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the appropriate congressional committees a report—
  - (A) that assesses-
  - (i) degree of cooperation and commitment from the social media companies to the mission of the Center; and
  - (ii) effectiveness of the Center in detecting and facilitating the removal or neutralization of clandestine foreign information warfare operations from social media platforms; and
  - (B) includes such recommendations for legislative or administrative action as the Center considers appropriate to carry out the functions of the Center.

### (e) Periodic reporting to the public

The Director of the Center shall—

- (1) once each quarter, make available to the public a report on key trends in foreign influence and disinformation operations, including any threats to campaigns and elections, to inform the public of the United States; and
- (2) as the Director considers necessary, provide more timely assessments relating to ongoing disinformation campaigns.

#### (f) Funding

Of the amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the National Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3003 of this title) in fiscal year 2020 and 2021, the Director of National Intelligence may use up to \$30,000,000 to carry out this section.

# (g) Definition of appropriate congressional committees

In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

- (1) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate:
- (2) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
- (3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate:
- (4) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
- (5) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
- (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;
- (7) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;
- (8) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
- House of Representatives;
  (9) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
- (10) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(Pub. L. 116-92, div. E, title LIII, §5323, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2130.)

#### DEFINITIONS

For definition of "intelligence community", referred to subsec. (b)(2), see section 5003 of div. E of Pub. L. 116-92, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title.

# § 3369a. Report on deepfake technology, foreign weaponization of deepfakes, and related notifications

# (a) Report on foreign weaponization of deepfakes and deepfake technology

#### (1) Report required

Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on—

- (A) the potential national security impacts of machine-manipulated media (commonly known as "deepfakes"); and
- (B) the actual or potential use of machinemanipulated media by foreign governments to spread disinformation or engage in other malign activities.

# (2) Matters to be included

The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

- (A) An assessment of the technical capabilities of foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, with respect to machine-manipulated media, machine-generated text, generative adversarial networks, and related machine-learning technologies, including—
  - (i) an assessment of the technical capabilities of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation with respect to the production and detection of machine-manipulated media; and
  - (ii) an annex describing those governmental elements within China and Russia known to have supported or facilitated machine-manipulated media research, development, or dissemination, as well as any civil-military fusion, private-sector, academic, or nongovernmental entities which have meaningfully participated in such activities.
- (B) An updated assessment of how foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, could use or are using machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text to harm the national security interests of the United States, including an assessment of the historic, current, or potential future efforts of China and Russia to use machine-manipulated media, including with respect to—
  - (i) the overseas or domestic dissemination of misinformation;
  - (ii) the attempted discrediting of political opponents or disfavored populations;
  - (iii) intelligence or influence operations directed against the United States, allies or partners of the United States, or other jurisdictions believed to be subject to Chinese or Russian interference.
- (C) An updated identification of the countertechnologies that have been or could

be developed and deployed by the United States Government, or by the private sector with Government support, to deter, detect, and attribute the use of machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text by foreign governments, foreign-government affiliates, or foreign individuals, along with an analysis of the benefits, limitations and drawbacks of such identified counter-technologies, including any emerging concerns related to privacy.

- (D) An identification of the offices within the elements of the intelligence community that have, or should have, lead responsibility for monitoring the development of, use of, and response to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text, including—
  - (i) a description of the coordination of such efforts across the intelligence community;
  - (ii) a detailed description of the existing capabilities, tools, and relevant expertise of such elements to determine whether a piece of media has been machine manipulated or machine generated, including the speed at which such determination can be made, the confidence level of the element in the ability to make such a determination accurately, and how increasing volume and improved quality of machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text may negatively impact such capabilities; and
  - (iii) a detailed description of planned or ongoing research and development efforts intended to improve the ability of the intelligence community to detect machinemanipulated media and machine-generated text.
- (E) A description of any research and development activities carried out or under consideration to be carried out by the intelligence community, including the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, relevant to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text detection technologies.
- (F) Updated recommendations regarding whether the intelligence community requires additional legal authorities, financial resources, or specialized personnel to address the national security threat posed by machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text.
- (G) Other additional information the Director determines appropriate.

#### (b) Form

The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

# (c) Requirement for notification

The Director of National Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of any other relevant departments or agencies of the Federal Government, shall notify the congressional intelligence committees each time the Director of National Intelligence determines—

(1) there is credible information or intelligence that a foreign entity has attempted, is

- attempting, or will attempt to deploy machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text aimed at the elections or domestic political processes of the United States; and
- (2) that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a foreign government, a foreign government-affiliated entity, or a foreign individual.

## (d) Annual update

Upon submission of the report in subsection (a), on an annual basis, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees any significant updates with respect to the matters described in subsection (a).

#### (e) Definitions

## (1) Machine-generated text

The term "machine-generated text" means text generated using machine-learning techniques in order to resemble writing in natural language.

## (2) Machine-manipulated media

The term "machine-manipulated media" has the meaning given that term in section 5724.

(Pub. L. 116-92, div. E, title LVII, §5709, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2168.)

#### REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 5724, referred to in subsec. (e)(2), is section 5724 of Pub. L. 116-92, which is set out as a note under section 3024 of this title.

#### DEFINITIONS

For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees", referred to in text, see section 5003 of div. E of Pub. L. 116-92, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title.

# § 3369b. Oversight of foreign influence in academia

#### (a) Definitions

In this section:

#### (1) Covered institution of higher education

The term "covered institution of higher education" means an institution described in section 1002 of title 20 that receives Federal funds in any amount and for any purpose.

# (2) Sensitive research subject

The term "sensitive research subject" means a subject of research that is carried out at a covered institution of higher education that receives funds that were appropriated for—

(A) the National Intelligence Program; or (B) any Federal agency the Director of National Intelligence deems appropriate.

# (b) Report required

Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, and not less frequently than once each year thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate and consistent with the privacy protections afforded to United States persons, shall