

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section effective on Jan. 1, 2019, as designated by the President, with implementing regulations and provisions relating to applicability to various situations, see section 5542 of Pub. L. 114-328 and Ex. Ord. No. 13825, set out as notes under section 801 of this title.

§ 920b. Art. 120b. Rape and sexual assault of a child

(a) RAPE OF A CHILD.—Any person subject to this chapter who—

- (1) commits a sexual act upon a child who has not attained the age of 12 years; or
- (2) commits a sexual act upon a child who has attained the age of 12 years by—
 - (A) using force against any person;
 - (B) threatening or placing that child in fear;
 - (C) rendering that child unconscious; or
 - (D) administering to that child a drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance;

is guilty of rape of a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b) SEXUAL ASSAULT OF A CHILD.—Any person subject to this chapter who commits a sexual act upon a child who has attained the age of 12 years is guilty of sexual assault of a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(c) SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD.—Any person subject to this chapter who commits a lewd act upon a child is guilty of sexual abuse of a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(d) AGE OF CHILD.—

(1) UNDER 12 YEARS.—In a prosecution under this section, it need not be proven that the accused knew the age of the other person engaging in the sexual act or lewd act. It is not a defense that the accused reasonably believed that the child had attained the age of 12 years.

(2) UNDER 16 YEARS.—In a prosecution under this section, it need not be proven that the accused knew that the other person engaging in the sexual act or lewd act had not attained the age of 16 years, but it is a defense in a prosecution under subsection (b) (sexual assault of a child) or subsection (c) (sexual abuse of a child), which the accused must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the accused reasonably believed that the child had attained the age of 16 years, if the child had in fact attained at least the age of 12 years.

(e) PROOF OF THREAT.—In a prosecution under this section, in proving that a person made a threat, it need not be proven that the person actually intended to carry out the threat or had the ability to carry out the threat.

(f) MARRIAGE.—In a prosecution under subsection (b) (sexual assault of a child) or subsection (c) (sexual abuse of a child), it is a defense, which the accused must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the persons engaging in the sexual act or lewd act were at that time married to each other, except where the accused commits a sexual act upon the person when the accused knows or reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware that the sexual act is occurring or when the other person is incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to im-

pairment by any drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance, and that condition was known or reasonably should have been known by the accused.

(g) CONSENT.—Lack of consent is not an element and need not be proven in any prosecution under this section. A child not legally married to the person committing the sexual act, lewd act, or use of force cannot consent to any sexual act, lewd act, or use of force.

(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) SEXUAL ACT AND SEXUAL CONTACT.—The terms “sexual act” and “sexual contact” have the meanings given those terms in section 920(g) of this title (article 120(g)), except that the term “sexual act” also includes the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.

(2) FORCE.—The term “force” means—

- (A) the use of a weapon;
- (B) the use of such physical strength or violence as is sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a child; or
- (C) inflicting physical harm.

In the case of a parent-child or similar relationship, the use or abuse of parental or similar authority is sufficient to constitute the use of force.

(3) THREATENING OR PLACING THAT CHILD IN FEAR.—The term “threatening or placing that child in fear” means a communication or action that is of sufficient consequence to cause the child to fear that non-compliance will result in the child or another person being subjected to the action contemplated by the communication or action.

(4) CHILD.—The term “child” means any person who has not attained the age of 16 years.

(5) LEWD ACT.—The term “lewd act” means—

- (A) any sexual contact with a child;
- (B) intentionally exposing one’s genitalia, anus, buttocks, or female areola or nipple to a child by any means, including via any communication technology, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person, or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person;

(C) intentionally communicating indecent language to a child by any means, including via any communication technology, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person, or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or

(D) any indecent conduct, intentionally done with or in the presence of a child, including via any communication technology, that amounts to a form of immorality relating to sexual impurity which is grossly vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to common propriety, and tends to excite sexual desire or deprave morals with respect to sexual relations.

(Added Pub. L. 112-81, div. A, title V, §541(b), Dec. 31, 2011, 125 Stat. 1407; amended Pub. L. 112-239, div. A, title X, §1076(a)(3), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 1948; Pub. L. 114-328, div. E, title LX, §5430(c), Dec. 23, 2016, 130 Stat. 2950.)

AMENDMENTS

2016—Subsec. (h)(1). Pub. L. 114-328 inserted before period at end “, except that the term ‘sexual act’ also includes the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person”.

2013—Pub. L. 112-239 made technical amendment to directory language of Pub. L. 112-81, which enacted this section.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2016 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 114-328 effective on Jan. 1, 2019, as designated by the President, with implementing regulations and provisions relating to applicability to various situations, see section 5542 of Pub. L. 114-328 and Ex. Ord. No. 13825, set out as notes under section 801 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2013 AMENDMENT

Pub. L. 112-239, div. A, title X, §1076(a), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 1947, provided that the amendment made by section 1076(a)(3) is effective Dec. 31, 2011, and as if included in Pub. L. 112-81 as enacted.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Amendment by Pub. L. 112-81 effective 180 days after Dec. 31, 2011, and applicable with respect to offenses committed on or after such effective date, see section 541(f) of Pub. L. 112-81, set out as an Effective Date of 2011 Amendment note under section 843 of this title.

§ 920c. Art. 120c. Other sexual misconduct

(a) INDECENT VIEWING, VISUAL RECORDING, OR BROADCASTING.—Any person subject to this chapter who, without legal justification or lawful authorization—

(1) knowingly and wrongfully views the private area of another person, without that other person’s consent and under circumstances in which that other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy;

(2) knowingly photographs, videotapes, films, or records by any means the private area of another person, without that other person’s consent and under circumstances in which that other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy; or

(3) knowingly broadcasts or distributes any such recording that the person knew or reasonably should have known was made under the circumstances proscribed in paragraphs (1) and (2);

is guilty of an offense under this section and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b) FORCIBLE PANDERING.—Any person subject to this chapter who compels another person to engage in an act of prostitution with any person is guilty of forcible pandering and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(c) INDECENT EXPOSURE.—Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally exposes, in an indecent manner, the genitalia, anus, buttocks, or female areola or nipple is guilty of indecent exposure and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ACT OF PROSTITUTION.—The term “act of prostitution” means a sexual act or sexual contact (as defined in section 920(g) of this title (article 120(g))) on account of which anything of value is given to, or received by, any person.

(2) PRIVATE AREA.—The term “private area” means the naked or underwear-clad genitalia, anus, buttocks, or female areola or nipple.

(3) REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY.—The term “under circumstances in which that other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy” means—

(A) circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that he or she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that an image of a private area of the person was being captured; or

(B) circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that a private area of the person would not be visible to the public.

(4) BROADCAST.—The term “broadcast” means to electronically transmit a visual image with the intent that it be viewed by a person or persons.

(5) DISTRIBUTE.—The term “distribute” means delivering to the actual or constructive possession of another, including transmission by electronic means.

(6) INDECENT MANNER.—The term “indecent manner” means conduct that amounts to a form of immorality relating to sexual impurity which is grossly vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to common propriety, and tends to excite sexual desire or deprave morals with respect to sexual relations.

(Added Pub. L. 112-81, div. A, title V, §541(c), Dec. 31, 2011, 125 Stat. 1409.)

EFFECTIVE DATE

Amendment by Pub. L. 112-81 effective 180 days after Dec. 31, 2011, and applicable with respect to offenses committed on or after such effective date, see section 541(f) of Pub. L. 112-81, set out as an Effective Date of 2011 Amendment note under section 843 of this title.

§ 921. Art. 121. Larceny and wrongful appropriation

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who wrongfully takes, obtains, or withholds, by any means, from the possession of the owner or of any other person any money, personal property, or article of value of any kind—

(1) with intent permanently to deprive or defraud another person of the use and benefit of property or to appropriate it to his own use or the use of any person other than the owner, steals that property and is guilty of larceny; or

(2) with intent temporarily to deprive or defraud another person of the use and benefit of property or to appropriate it to his own use or the use of any person other than the owner, is guilty of wrongful appropriation.

(b) Any person found guilty of larceny or wrongful appropriation shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 73.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Revised section	Source (U.S. Code)	Source (Statutes at Large)
921(a)	50:715(a).	May 5, 1950, ch. 169, §1
921(b)	50:715(b).	(Art. 121), 64 Stat. 140.

In subsection (a), the words “whatever” and “true” are omitted as surplusage. The word “it” is substituted for the words “the same” in clauses (1) and (2).