

of the Treasury, shall advance a coordinated international effort—

(1) to work with foreign governments—

(A) to share financial investigations intelligence, as appropriate;

(B) to block the assets identified pursuant to paragraph (2); and

(C) to provide technical assistance to help governments establish the necessary legal framework to carry out asset forfeitures; and

(2) to carry out special financial investigations to identify and track assets taken from the people and institutions of Venezuela through theft, corruption, money laundering, or other illicit means.

**(b) Strategy requirement**

**(1) In general**

Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, the President, acting through the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsection (a) to Congress.

**(2) Additional elements**

The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) assess whether the United States or another member of the international community should establish a managed fund to hold the assets identified pursuant to subsection (a)(2) that could be returned to a future democratic government in Venezuela; and

(B) include such recommendations as the President and the Secretary of State consider appropriate for legislative or administrative action in the United States that would be needed to establish and manage the fund described in subparagraph (A).

(Pub. L. 116–94, div. J, title I, §151, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 3039.)

SUBCHAPTER VI—RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN VENEZUELA

**§ 9751. Developing and implementing a coordinated sanctions strategy with partners in the Western Hemisphere and the European Union**

**(a) Strengthening sanctions capacity in Latin America and the Caribbean**

The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall offer to provide technical assistance to partner governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to assist such governments in establishing the legislative and regulatory frameworks needed to impose targeted sanctions on officials of the Maduro regime who—

(1) are responsible for human rights abuses;

(2) have engaged in public corruption; or

(3) are undermining democratic institutions and processes in Venezuela.

**(b) Coordinating international sanctions**

The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall engage in

diplomatic efforts with partner governments, including the Government of Canada, governments in the European Union, and governments in Latin America and the Caribbean, to impose targeted sanctions on the Maduro regime officials described in subsection (a).

**(c) Strategy requirement**

Not later than 90 days after December 20, 2019, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsection (a) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(5) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(6) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

**(d) Authorization of appropriations**

**(1) In general**

There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for fiscal year 2020, \$3,000,000 to carry out the activities set forth in subsection (a).

**(2) Notification requirements**

Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are subject to the notification requirements applicable to expenditures from the Economic Support Fund under section 2346(c) of this title and the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Fund under section 2291h of this title to the extent that such funds are expended.

(Pub. L. 116–94, div. J, title I, §161, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 3040.)

**§ 9752. Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft**

**(a) Findings**

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In late 2016, Venezuelan state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (referred to in this section as “PDVSA”), through a no compete transaction, secured a loan from Russian government-controlled oil company Rosneft, using 49.9 percent of PDVSA’s American subsidiary, CITGO Petroleum Corporation, including its assets in the United States, as collateral. As a result of this transaction, 100 percent of CITGO is held as collateral by PDVSA’s creditors.

(2) CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of PDVSA, is engaged in interstate commerce and owns and controls critical energy infrastructure in 19 States of the United States, including an extensive network of pipelines, 48 terminals, and 3 refineries, with a combined oil refining capacity of 749,000 barrels per day. CITGO’s refinery in Lake Charles, Louisiana, is the sixth largest refinery in the United States.

(3) The Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Rosneft, which is controlled by

the Government of the Russian Federation, and its Executive Chairman, Igor Sechin, following Russia's military invasion of Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.

(4) The Department of Homeland Security has designated the energy sector as critical to United States infrastructure.

(5) The growing economic crisis in Venezuela raises the probability that the Maduro regime and PDVSA will default on their international debt obligations, resulting in a scenario in which Rosneft could come into control of CITGO's United States energy infrastructure holdings.

**(b) Sense of Congress**

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) control of critical United States energy infrastructure by Rosneft, a Russian government-controlled entity currently under United States sanctions that is led by Igor Sechin, who is also under United States sanctions and is a close associate of Vladimir Putin, would pose a significant risk to United States national security and energy security; and

(2) a default by PDVSA on its loan from Rosneft, resulting in Rosneft coming into possession of PDVSA's United States CITGO assets, would warrant careful consideration by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.

**(c) Preventing Rosneft from controlling United States energy infrastructure**

The President shall take all necessary steps to prevent Rosneft from gaining control of critical United States energy infrastructure.

**(d) Security risk report**

Not later than 90 days after December 20, 2019, the President shall submit a report assessing the national security risks posed by potential Russian acquisition and control of CITGO's United States energy infrastructure holdings to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(5) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives; and

(6) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(Pub. L. 116-94, div. J, title I, §163, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 3041.)

**§ 9753. Countering Russian influence in Venezuela**

**(a) Short title**

This section may be cited as the “Russian-Venezuelan Threat Mitigation Act”.

**(b) Threat assessment and strategy to counter Russian influence in Venezuela**

**(1) Defined term**

In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

**(2) Threat assessment**

Not later than 120 days after December 20, 2019, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding—

(A) an assessment of Russian-Venezuelan security cooperation;

(B) the potential threat such cooperation poses to the United States and countries in the Western Hemisphere; and

(C) a strategy to counter threats identified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).

**(c) Aliens ineligible for visas, admission, or parole**

**(1) Aliens described**

An alien described in this paragraph is an alien who the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a designee of either Secretary) knows, or has reason to believe, is acting or has acted on behalf of the Government of Russia in direct support of the security forces of the Maduro regime.

**(2) Visas, admission, or parole**

An alien described in paragraph (1) is—

(A) inadmissible to the United States;

(B) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(C) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

**(3) Current visas revoked**

**(A) In general**

An alien described in paragraph (1) is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

**(B) Immediate effect**

A revocation under subparagraph (A) shall—

(i) take effect immediately; and

(ii) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's possession.

**(4) Exceptions**

Sanctions under paragraphs (2) and (3) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary—

(A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations; or

(B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

**(5) National security**

The President may waive the application of this subsection with respect to an alien if the President—