

(1) A description of the organization of the United Front Work Department of the People's Republic of China, or the successors of the United Front Work Department, and the links between the United Front Work Department and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

(2) An assessment of the degree to which organizations that are associated with or receive funding from the United Front Work Department, particularly such entities operating in the United States, are formally tasked by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of China.

(3) A description of the efforts by the United Front Work Department and subsidiary organizations of the United Front Work Department to target, coerce, and influence foreign populations, particularly those of ethnic Chinese descent.

(4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy, consulates, and organizations affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (including, at a minimum, the United Front Work Department) to influence the United States-based Chinese Student Scholar Associations.

(5) A description of the evolution of the role of the United Front Work Department under the leadership of the President of China.

(6) An assessment of the activities of the United Front Work Department designed to influence the opinions of elected leaders of the United States, or candidates for elections in the United States, with respect to issues of importance to the Chinese Communist Party.

(7) A listing of all known organizations affiliated with the United Front Work Department that are operating in the United States as of the date of the report.

(8) An identification of influence activities and operations employed by the Chinese Communist Party against the United States science and technology sectors, specifically employees of the United States Government, researchers, scientists, and students in the science and technology sector in the United States.

(9) With respect to reports submitted after the first report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and campaigns conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.

(c) Coordination

In carrying out subsection (a), the Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the intelligence community.

(d) Form

Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, §1107, as added Pub. L. 116-92, div. E, title LV, §5511(a), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2146; amended Pub. L. 116-260, div. W, title VI, §605(a), (d)(1), Dec. 27, 2020, 134 Stat. 2386, 2387.)

AMENDMENTS

2020—Pub. L. 116-260, §605(d)(1)(A), substituted “Chinese Communist Party” for “Communist Party of China” in section catchline.

Subsecs. (a), (b)(1). Pub. L. 116-260, §605(d)(1)(B), substituted “Chinese Communist Party” for “Communist Party of China”.

Subsec. (b)(8), (9). Pub. L. 116-260, §605(a), added par. (8) and redesignated former par. (8) as (9).

INITIAL REPORT

Pub. L. 116-92, div. E, title LV, §5511(c), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2147, provided that: “The Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees [Select Committee on Intelligence and Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives], the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the first report under section 1107 of the National Security Act of 1947 [50 U.S.C. 3237], as added by subsection (a), by not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 20, 2019].”

§ 3237a. Annual reports on security services of the People's Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

(a) Definitions

In this section:

(1) Appropriate congressional committees

The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(2) Chinese security services

The term “Chinese security services” means—

(A) the security services of the Government of the People's Republic of China, including the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security; and

(B) any known front organizations or aliases associated with such security services, including officers associated with the national security division of the Hong Kong Police Force and other officers of the Hong Kong Police Force selected by the Committee for Safeguarding National Security to work on matters relating to national security.

(b) Requirement

On an annual basis through 2047, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the presence and activities of Chinese security services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(c) Contents

Each report under subsection (b) shall include, with respect to the year covered by the report, the following:

(1) Identification of the approximate number of personnel affiliated with Chinese security

services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, including a breakdown of such personnel by the specific security service and the division of the security service, and (to the extent possible) an identification of any such personnel associated with the national security division of the Hong Kong Police Force.

(2) A description of the command and control structures of such security services, including information regarding the extent to which such security services are controlled by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or the Government of the People's Republic of China.

(3) A description of the working relationship and coordination mechanisms of the Chinese security services with the police force of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(4) A description of the activities conducted by Chinese security services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, including—

(A) information regarding the extent to which such security services, and officers associated with the national security division of the Hong Kong Police Force, are engaged in frontline policing, serving in advisory and assistance roles, or both;

(B) an assessment of the likelihood of such security services conducting renditions of individuals from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to China and a listing of every known individual subject to such rendition during the year covered by the report; and

(C) an assessment of how such activities conducted by Chinese security services contribute to self-censorship and corruption within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(5) A discussion of the doctrine and tactics employed by Chinese security services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, including an overview of the extent to which such security services employ surveillance, detection, and control methods, including “high-tech” policing models and “preventative policing tactics”, that are consistent with the rise of digital authoritarianism, and used in a manner similar to methods used in the Xinjiang region of China.

(6) An overview of the funding for Chinese security services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, including an assessment of the extent to which funding is drawn locally from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government or from the Government of China.

(7) A discussion of the various surveillance technologies used by security services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, including—

(A) a list of the key companies that provide such technologies; and

(B) an assessment of the degree to which such technologies can be accessed by Chinese security services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(d) Coordination

In carrying out subsection (b), the Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and any other relevant head of an element of the intelligence community.

(e) Form

Each report submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title XI, § 1107A, as added Pub. L. 116-260, div. W, title VI, § 611(b), Dec. 27, 2020, 134 Stat. 2393.)

FINDINGS OF CONGRESS

Pub. L. 116-260, div. W, title VI, § 611(a), Dec. 27, 2020, 134 Stat. 2393, provided that: “Congress finds that the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China promulgated the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on June 30, 2020.”

§ 3238. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the United States by the Russian Federation

(a) Requirement

On an annual basis, the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the influence operations and campaigns in the United States conducted by the Russian Federation.

(b) Contents

Each report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A description and listing of the Russian organizations and persons involved in influence operations and campaigns operating in the United States as of the date of the report.

(2) An assessment of organizations that are associated with or receive funding from organizations and persons identified in paragraph (1), particularly such entities operating in the United States.

(3) A description of the efforts by the organizations and persons identified in paragraph (1) to target, coerce, and influence populations within the United States.

(4) An assessment of the activities of the organizations and persons identified in paragraph (1) designed to influence the opinions of elected leaders of the United States or candidates for election in the United States.

(5) With respect to reports submitted after the first report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and campaigns conducted by the organizations and persons identified in paragraph (1).

(c) Coordination

In carrying out subsection (a), the Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Fed-