

§ 3524. Support for the Associate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs

(a) Selection of Associate Director

The Associate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs shall be selected by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, from among commissioned officers of the Armed Forces who are general or flag officers.

(b) Support for activities

(1) In general

In order to improve the provision of support to, and the receipt of support from, the Central Intelligence Agency, and to improve deconfliction of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence¹ shall ensure that the Associate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs has access to, and support from, offices, agencies, and programs of the Department necessary for the purposes of the Associate Director as follows:

(A) To facilitate and coordinate Department of Defense support for the Central Intelligence Agency requested by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and approved by the Secretary, including oversight of Department of Defense military and civilian personnel detailed or assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency.

(B) To prioritize, communicate, and coordinate Department of Defense requests for, and the provision of support to, the Department of Defense from the Central Intelligence Agency, including support requested by and provided to the commanders of the combatant commands and subordinate task forces and commands.

(2) Policies

The Under Secretary shall develop and supervise the implementation of policies to integrate and communicate Department of Defense requirements and requests for support from the Central Intelligence Agency that are coordinated by the Associate Director pursuant to paragraph (1)(B).

(Pub. L. 114–328, div. A, title X, §1054, Dec. 23, 2016, 130 Stat. 2398.)

CODIFICATION

Section was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, and not as part of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 which comprises this chapter.

CHANGE OF NAME

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence redesignated and references deemed to refer to Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, see section 1621(a) of Pub. L. 116–92, set out as a note under section 137 of Title 10, Armed Forces.

¹ See Change of Name note below.

§ 3525. Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity

(a) Establishment

(1) In general

There is established in the Agency an Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity (in this section referred to as the “Office”).

(2) Appointment of Ombudsman

The Office shall be headed by an Ombudsman, who shall be appointed by the Director from among current or former senior staff officers of the Agency.

(b) Duties and responsibilities

The Ombudsman shall—

(1) on an annual basis, conduct a survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of the Agency;

(2) implement a procedure by which any officer or employee of the Agency may submit to the Office a complaint alleging politicization, bias, lack of objectivity, or other issues relating to a failure of tradecraft in analysis conducted by the Agency;

(3) except as provided in paragraph (4), upon receiving a complaint submitted pursuant to paragraph (2), take reasonable action to investigate the complaint, make a determination as to whether the incident described in the complaint involved politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity, and prepare a report that—

(A) summarizes the facts relevant to the complaint;

(B) documents the determination of the Ombudsman with respect to the complaint; and

(C) contains a recommendation for remedial action;

(4) if a complaint submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) alleges politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity in the collection of intelligence information, refer the complaint to the official responsible for supervising collection operations of the Agency; and

(5) continuously monitor changes in areas of analysis that the Ombudsman determines involve a heightened risk of politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity, to ensure that any change in the analytic line arises from proper application of analytic tradecraft and not as a result of politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity.

(c) Reports

(1) On an annual basis, the Ombudsman shall submit to the intelligence committees a report on the results of the survey conducted pursuant to subsection (b)(1) with respect to the most recent fiscal year.

(2) On an annual basis, the Ombudsman shall submit to the intelligence committees a report that includes—

(A) the number of complaints of submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(2) during the most recent fiscal year; and

(B) a description of the nature of such complaints, the actions taken by the Office or any other relevant element or component of the Agency with respect to such complaints, and the resolution of such complaints.