

stresses the inadequacy of the 2-year sentence prescribed by existing law in cases where the object of the conspiracy is the commission of a very serious offense.

The punishment provision of said section 294 of title 18 was considered for inclusion in this revised section. It provided the same penalties for conspiracy to violate the provisions of certain counterfeiting laws, as are applicable in the case of conviction for the specific violations. Such a punishment would seem as desirable for all conspiracies as for such offenses as counterfeiting and transporting stolen property in interstate commerce.

A multiplicity of unnecessary enactments inevitably leads to confusion and disregard of law. (See reviser's note under section 493 of this title.)

Since consolidation was highly desirable and because of the strong objections of prosecutors to the general application of the punishment provision of said section 294, the revised section represents the best compromise that could be devised between sharply conflicting views.

A number of special conspiracy provisions, relating to specific offenses, which were contained in various sections incorporated in this title, were omitted because adequately covered by this section. A few exceptions were made, (1) where the conspiracy would constitute the only offense, or (2) where the punishment provided in this section would not be commensurate with the gravity of the offense. Special conspiracy provisions were retained in sections 241, 286, 372, 757, 794, 956, 1201, 2271, 2384 and 2388 of this title. Special conspiracy provisions were added to sections 2153 and 2154 of this title.

Editorial Notes

AMENDMENTS

1994—Pub. L. 103-322 substituted “fined under this title” for “fined not more than \$10,000”.

§ 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer

If two or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession, or District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six years, or both.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 701; Pub. L. 107-273, div. B, title IV, §4002(d)(1)(D), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1809.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §54 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §21, 35 Stat. 1092).

Scope of section was enlarged to cover all possessions of the United States. When the section was first enacted in 1861 there were no possessions, and hence the use of the words “State or Territory” was sufficient to describe the area then subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The word “District” was inserted by the codifiers of the 1909 Criminal Code.

Editorial Notes

AMENDMENTS

2002—Pub. L. 107-273 substituted “under this title” for “not more than \$5,000”.

§ 373. Solicitation to commit a crime of violence

(a) Whoever, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent, solicits, commands, induces, or otherwise endeavors to persuade such other person to engage in such conduct, shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or (notwithstanding section 3571) fined not more than one-half of the maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the crime solicited, or both; or if the crime solicited is punishable by life imprisonment or death, shall be imprisoned for not more than twenty years.

(b) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intent, the defendant prevented the commission of the crime solicited. A renunciation is not “voluntary and complete” if it is motivated in whole or in part by a decision to postpone the commission of the crime until another time or to substitute another victim or another but similar objective. If the defendant raises the affirmative defense at trial, the defendant has the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

(c) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the person solicited could not be convicted of the crime because he lacked the state of mind required for its commission, because he was incompetent or irresponsible, or because he is immune from prosecution or is not subject to prosecution.

(Added Pub. L. 98-473, title II, §1003(a), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2138; amended Pub. L. 99-646, §26, Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat. 3597; Pub. L. 103-322, title XXXIII, §330016(2)(A), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2148.)

Editorial Notes

AMENDMENTS

1994—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103-322 inserted “(notwithstanding section 3571)” before “fined not more than one-half”.

1986—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 99-646 substituted “property or against the person of another” for “the person or property of another” and inserted “life imprisonment or” before “death”.

CHAPTER 21—CONTEMPTS

Sec.

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|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| 401. | Power of court. |
| 402. | Contempts constituting crimes. |
| 403. | Protection of the privacy of child victims and child witnesses. |

Editorial Notes

AMENDMENTS

1990—Pub. L. 101-647, title II, §225(b)(2), Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4806, added item 403.

1949—Act May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §8(a), (b), 63 Stat. 90, struck out “CONSTITUTING CRIMES” in chapter heading and substituted “Contempts constituting crimes” for “Criminal contempts” in item 402.

§ 401. Power of court

A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as—

(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;

(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;

(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 701; Pub. L. 107-273, div. B, title III, §3002(a)(1), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1805.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on section 385 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Judicial Code and Judiciary (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §268, 36 Stat. 1163).

Said section 385 conferred two powers. The first part authorizing courts of the United States to impose and administer oaths will remain in title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Judicial Code and Judiciary. The second part relating to contempt of court constitutes this section.

Changes in phraseology and arrangement were made.

Editorial Notes

AMENDMENTS

2002—Pub. L. 107-273 inserted “or both,” after “fine or imprisonment,” in introductory provisions.

§ 402. Contempts constituting crimes

Any person, corporation or association willfully disobeying any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of any district court of the United States or any court of the District of Columbia, by doing any act or thing therein, or thereby forbidden, if the act or thing so done be of such character as to constitute also a criminal offense under any statute of the United States or under the laws of any State in which the act was committed, shall be prosecuted for such contempt as provided in section 3691 of this title and shall be punished by a fine under this title or imprisonment, or both.

Such fine shall be paid to the United States or to the complainant or other party injured by the act constituting the contempt, or may, where more than one is so damaged, be divided or apportioned among them as the court may direct, but in no case shall the fine to be paid to the United States exceed, in case the accused is a natural person, the sum of \$1,000, nor shall such imprisonment exceed the term of six months.

This section shall not be construed to relate to contempts committed in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, nor to contempts committed in disobedience of any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command entered in any suit or action brought or prosecuted in the name of, or on behalf of, the United States, but the same, and all other cases of contempt not specifically embraced in this section may be punished in conformity to the prevailing usages at law.

For purposes of this section, the term “State” includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 701; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §8(c), 63 Stat. 90; Pub. L. 101-647, title XII, §1205(c), Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4830; Pub. L. 103-322, title XXXIII, §§33001(f), 330016(2)(E), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2145, 2148.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

1948 ACT

Based on sections 386, 387, 389, and 390a of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Judicial Code and Judiciary (Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, §§1, 21, 22, 24, 38 Stat. 730, 738, 739).

Section 21 of the Clayton Act, section 386 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Judicial Code and Judiciary, is here consolidated with parts of sections 1, 22, and 24 of the same act. Section 1 of said act, section 390a of title 28 U.S.C., 1940 ed., Judicial Code and Judiciary, defined person or persons. Section 22 of said act, section 387 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Judicial Code and Judiciary, regulated the procedure and provided for the punishment of contempts. Section 24 of said act, section 389 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Judicial Code and Judiciary, limited the application of these sections to certain kinds of contempt.

In transferring these sections to this title and in consolidating them numerous changes of phraseology were necessary which do not, however, change their meaning or substance. Words “corporation or association” were inserted after “any person” in substitution for the definition provisions of section 390a of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Judicial Code and Judiciary, which read as follows: “The word ‘person’ or ‘persons’ wherever used in sections 381-383, 386-390a of this title, sections 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27 and 44 of title 15, and section 412 of title 18 shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.”

The words “any person, corporation, or association,” unqualified except by the context of the section mean all that the more lengthy definition included. Only those persons, corporations, and associations who were parties to the order or had actual notice of it may be punished for contempt. (See *McCaully v. First Trust & Savings Bank*, C.C.A. Ill. 1921, 276 F. 117. See, also *National Labor Relations Board v. Blackstone Mfg. Co.*, C.C.A. 1941, 123 F. 2d 633.) The fact that the contemnor was incorporated or organized under a foreign law or under the laws of a particular State or Territory would hardly be relevant to the issue of criminal contempt.

As noted above these sections were part of the Clayton Act, entitled “An act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes.” Whatever doubt might have existed as to whether the contempt provisions were variously limited to antitrust cases seems to be dispelled by the case of *Sandefur v. Canoe Creek Coal Co.* (C.C.A. Ky. 1923, 293 F. 379, certified question answered 45 S. Ct. 18, 266 U.S. 42, 69 L. Ed. 162, 35 A.L.R. 451), where the court says: “The act, considered as a whole, covers several more or less distinct subjects. * * * The first eight sections pertain directly to the subject of trust and monopolies; section 9 concerns interstate commerce; section 10, combinations among common carriers; section 11, proceedings to enforce certain provisions of the act; sections 12-16, antitrust procedure and remedies; sections 17-19, regulations of injunction and restraining orders in all cases; section 20 limits the power of an equity court to issue any injunction in a certain class of cases, viz., between employer and the employee; and sections 21-24 pertain to procedure in any district court, punishing contemptuous disregard of any order of such court, providing the act constituting contempt is also a criminal offense. Observing this relation of the various parts of the act to each other, we think ‘within the purview of this act’ must refer to that portion of the act which most broadly covers the subject-matter to which section 22 is devoted, and this portion is section