

(4) suspend United States participation in a project when a non-United States participant fails to complete a scheduled step or activity on time, unless directed by the Secretary of Energy to resume United States participation.

**(d) Authority to manage more than one project**

(1) Subject to paragraph (2), an employee of the Federal Government may serve as on-site manager for more than one project, including projects at different locations.

(2) If such an employee serves as on-site manager for more than one project in a fiscal year, the total cost of the projects for that fiscal year may not exceed \$150,000,000.

**(e) Steps or activities**

Steps or activities referred to in subsection (c)(1) are those activities that, if not completed, will prevent a project from achieving its disarmament or nonproliferation goals, including, at a minimum, the following:

(1) Identification and acquisition of permits (as defined in subsection (g)).

(2) Verification that the items, substances, or capabilities to be dismantled, secured, or otherwise modified are available for dismantlement, securing, or modification.

(3) Timely provision of financial, personnel, management, transportation, and other resources.

**(f) Notification to Congress**

In any case in which the Secretary of Energy directs an on-site manager to resume United States participation in a project under subsection (c)(4), the Secretary shall concurrently notify Congress of such direction.

**(g) Permit defined**

In this section, the term “permit” means any local or national permit for development, general construction, environmental, land use, or other purposes that is required in the state of the former Soviet Union in which the project is being or is proposed to be carried out.

**(h) Effective date**

This section shall take effect six months after November 24, 2003.

(Pub. L. 108-136, div. C, title XXXI, §3125, Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1748.)

**Editorial Notes**

**CODIFICATION**

Section was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, and not as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 which comprises this chapter.

**§§ 5962, 5963. Repealed. Pub. L. 113-291, div. A, title XIII, § 1351(11), Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3607**

Section 5962, Pub. L. 108-136, div. A, title XIII, §1307, Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1661, related to annual certifications on use of facilities being constructed for Cooperative Threat Reduction projects or activities.

Section 5963, Pub. L. 108-136, div. A, title XIII, §1308, Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1662; Pub. L. 110-53, title XVIII, §1811(4), Aug. 3, 2007, 121 Stat. 493; Pub. L. 110-181, div. A, title XIII, §1305, Jan. 28, 2008, 122 Stat. 413, related to authority to use Cooperative Threat Reduction funds outside the former Soviet Union.

**§§ 5964, 5965. Repealed. Pub. L. 113-291, div. A, title XIII, § 1351(12)(B), Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3607**

Section 5964, Pub. L. 111-84, div. A, title XIII, §1304, Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2558, related to metrics for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

Section 5965, Pub. L. 111-84, div. A, title XIII, §1305, Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2559, related to Cooperative Threat Reduction Program authority for urgent threat reduction activities.

**CHAPTER 69—CUBAN DEMOCRACY**

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**§ 6001. Findings**

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The government of Fidel Castro has demonstrated consistent disregard for internationally accepted standards of human rights and for democratic values. It restricts the Cuban people’s exercise of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and other rights recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948. It has refused to admit into Cuba the representative of the United Nations Human Rights Commission appointed to investigate human rights violations on the island.

(2) The Cuban people have demonstrated their yearning for freedom and their increasing opposition to the Castro government by risking their lives in organizing independent, democratic activities on the island and by undertaking hazardous flights for freedom to the United States and other countries.

(3) The Castro government maintains a military-dominated economy that has decreased the well-being of the Cuban people in order to enable the government to engage in military interventions and subversive activities throughout the world and, especially, in the Western Hemisphere. These have included involvement in narcotics trafficking and support for the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador.

(4) There is no sign that the Castro regime is prepared to make any significant concessions to democracy or to undertake any form of democratic opening. Efforts to suppress dissent through intimidation, imprisonment, and exile have accelerated since the political changes that have occurred in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

(5) Events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have dramatically reduced Cuba’s external support and threaten Cuba’s food and oil supplies.

(6) The fall of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the now universal recognition in Latin America and the