

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 965; Pub. L. 89-711, § 1, Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1104; Pub. L. 104-132, title I, §§ 101, 106, Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1217, 1220.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

This section makes no material change in existing practice. Notwithstanding the opportunity open to litigants to abuse the writ, the courts have consistently refused to entertain successive “nuisance” applications for habeas corpus. It is derived from H.R. 4232 introduced in the first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress by Chairman Hatton Sumners of the Committee on the Judiciary and referred to that Committee.

The practice of suing out successive, repetitious, and unfounded writs of habeas corpus imposes an unnecessary burden on the courts. See *Dorsey v. Gill*, 1945, 148 F.2d 857, 862, in which Miller, J., notes that “petitions for the writ are used not only as they should be to protect unfortunate persons against miscarriages of justice, but also as a device for harassing court, custodial, and enforcement officers with a multiplicity of repetitious, meritless requests for relief. The most extreme example is that of a person who, between July 1, 1939, and April 1944 presented in the District Court 50 petitions for writs of habeas corpus; another person has presented 27 petitions; a third, 24; a fourth, 22; a fifth, 20. One hundred nineteen persons have presented 597 petitions—an average of 5.”

SENATE REVISION AMENDMENTS

Section amended to modify original language which denied Federal judges power to entertain application for writ where legality of detention had been determined on prior application and later application presented on new grounds, and to omit reference to rehearing in section catch line and original provision authorizing hearing judge to grant rehearing. 80th Congress, Senate Report No. 1559, Amendment No. 45.

Editorial Notes

AMENDMENTS

1996—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 104-132, § 106(a), substituted “, except as provided in section 2255.” for “and the petition presents no new ground not heretofore presented and determined, and the judge or court is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry.”

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 104-132, § 106(b), amended subsec. (b) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (b) read as follows: “When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing

of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.”

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 104-132, § 101, added subsec. (d).

1966—Pub. L. 89-711 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), struck out provision making the subsection’s terms applicable to applications seeking inquiry into detention of persons detained pursuant to judgments of State courts, and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

§ 2245. Certificate of trial judge admissible in evidence

On the hearing of an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment the certificate of the judge who presided at the trial resulting in the judgment, setting forth the facts occurring at the trial, shall be admissible in evidence. Copies of the certificate shall be filed with the court in which the application is pending and in the court in which the trial took place.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 966.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

This section makes no substantive change in existing law. It is derived from H.R. 4232 introduced in the first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress by Chairman Sumners of the House Committee on the Judiciary. It clarifies existing law and promotes uniform procedure.

§ 2246. Evidence; depositions; affidavits

On application for a writ of habeas corpus, evidence may be taken orally or by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by affidavit. If affidavits are admitted any party shall have the right to propound written interrogatories to the affiants, or to file answering affidavits.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 966.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

This section is derived from H.R. 4232 introduced in the first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress by Chairman Sumners of the House Committee on the Judiciary. It clarifies existing practice without substantial change.

§ 2247. Documentary evidence

On application for a writ of habeas corpus documentary evidence, transcripts of proceedings upon arraignment, plea and sentence and a transcript of the oral testimony introduced on any previous similar application by or in behalf of the same petitioner, shall be admissible in evidence.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 966.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Derived from H.R. 4232, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session. It is declaratory of existing law and practice.

§ 2248. Return or answer; conclusiveness

The allegations of a return to the writ of habeas corpus or of an answer to an order to show cause in a habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as true except to the extent that the judge finds from the evidence that they are not true.