

**§ 2201. Transfers of spoils of war****(a) Eligibility for transfer**

Spoils of war in the possession, custody, or control of the United States may be transferred to any other party, including any government, group, or person, by sale, grant, loan or in any other manner, only to the extent and in the same manner that property of the same type, if otherwise owned by the United States, may be so transferred.

**(b) Terms and conditions**

Any transfer pursuant to subsection (a) shall be subject to all of the terms, conditions, and requirements applicable to the transfer of property of the same type otherwise owned by the United States.

(Pub. L. 103-236, title V, § 552, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 482.)

**Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries****SHORT TITLE**

Pub. L. 103-236, title V, § 551, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 482, provided that: “This part [part B (§§ 551-556) of title V of Pub. L. 103-236, enacting this chapter] may be cited as the ‘Spoils of War Act of 1994.’”

**§ 2202. Prohibition on transfers to countries which support terrorism**

Spoils of war in the possession, custody, or control of the United States may not be transferred to any country determined by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 2780 of title 22, to be a nation whose government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(Pub. L. 103-236, title V, § 553, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 482.)

**§ 2203. Report on previous transfers**

Not later than 90 days after April 30, 1994, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing any spoils of war obtained subsequent to August 2, 1990 that were transferred to any party, including any government, group, or person, before April 30, 1994. Such report shall be submitted in unclassified form to the extent possible.

(Pub. L. 103-236, title V, § 554, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 482.)

**§ 2204. Definitions**

As used in this chapter—

(1) the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, or, where required by law for certain reporting purposes, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Select<sup>1</sup> Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

(2) the term “enemy” means any country, government, group, or person that has been engaged in hostilities, whether or not lawfully authorized, with the United States;

(3) the term “person” means—

(A) any natural person;

(B) any corporation, partnership, or other legal entity; and

(C) any organization, association, or group; and

(4) the term “spoils of war” means enemy movable property lawfully captured, seized, confiscated, or found which has become United States property in accordance with the laws of war.

(Pub. L. 103-236, title V, § 555, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 482.)

**§ 2205. Construction**

Nothing in this chapter shall apply to—

(1) the abandonment or failure to take possession of spoils of war by troops in the field for valid military reasons related to the conduct of the immediate conflict, including the burden of transporting such property or a decision to allow allied forces to take immediate possession of certain property solely for use during an ongoing conflict;

(2) the abandonment or return of any property obtained, borrowed, or requisitioned for temporary use during military operations without intent to retain possession of such property;

(3) the destruction of spoils of war by troops in the field;

(4) the return of spoils of war to previous owners from whom such property had been seized by enemy forces; or

(5) minor articles of personal property which have lawfully become the property of individual members of the armed forces as war trophies pursuant to public written authorization from the Department of Defense.

(Pub. L. 103-236, title V, § 556, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 483.)

**CHAPTER 40—DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

|       |              |
|-------|--------------|
| Sec.  |              |
| 2301. | Findings.    |
| 2302. | Definitions. |

**SUBCHAPTER I—DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS**

|       |                                                                                                            |
|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2311. | Response to threats of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.                                       |
| 2312. | Repealed.                                                                                                  |
| 2313. | Nuclear, chemical, and biological emergency response.                                                      |
| 2314. | Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives response team.                      |
| 2315. | Testing of preparedness for emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons. |
| 2316. | Actions to increase civilian expertise.                                                                    |
| 2317. | Rapid response information system.                                                                         |

**SUBCHAPTER II—INTERDICTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND RELATED MATERIALS**

|       |                                                                       |
|-------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2331. | Procurement of detection equipment for United States border security. |
| 2332. | Sense of Congress concerning criminal penalties.                      |
| 2333. | International border security.                                        |

<sup>1</sup> So in original. Probably should be preceded by “Permanent”.

Sec.

2334. Training program.

## SUBCHAPTER III—CONTROL AND DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND RELATED MATERIALS THREATENING THE UNITED STATES

2341. Elimination of plutonium production.

2342. Cooperative program on research, development, and demonstration of technology regarding nuclear or radiological terrorism.

2343. Matters relating to the international materials protection, control, and accounting program of the Department of Energy.

2344. Strengthened international security for nuclear materials and security of nuclear operations.

2345. Export control programs.

## SUBCHAPTER IV—COORDINATION OF POLICY AND COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

2351. National coordinator on nonproliferation.

2352. National Security Council Committee on Nonproliferation.

2353. Comprehensive preparedness program.

2354. Termination.

## SUBCHAPTER IV—A—NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE COORDINATION

2357. Findings.

2357a. Definitions.

2357b. Establishment of Committee on Nonproliferation Assistance.

2357c. Purposes and authority.

2357d. Administrative support.

2357e. Confidentiality of information.

2357f. Statutory construction.

2357g. Reporting and consultation.

## SUBCHAPTER V—MISCELLANEOUS

2361. Sense of Congress concerning contracting policy.

2362. Transfers of allocations among cooperative threat reduction programs.

2363. Sense of Congress concerning assistance to states of former Soviet Union.

2364. Purchase of low-enriched uranium derived from Russian highly enriched uranium.

2365. Sense of Congress concerning purchase, packaging, and transportation of fissile materials at risk of theft.

2366. Repealed.

2367. Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles.

2368. Annual reports on the proliferation of missiles and essential components of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons.

2369. Repealed.

2370. Notification of Committees on Armed Services with respect to certain nonproliferation and proliferation activities.

2371. Repealed.

## § 2301. Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies are increasingly available from worldwide sources. Technical information relating to such weapons is readily available on the Internet, and raw materials for chemical, biological, and radiological weapons are widely available for legitimate commercial purposes.

(2) The former Soviet Union produced and maintained a vast array of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

(3) Many of the states of the former Soviet Union retain the facilities, materials, and technologies capable of producing additional quantities of weapons of mass destruction.

(4) The disintegration of the former Soviet Union was accompanied by disruptions of command and control systems, deficiencies in accountability for weapons, weapons-related materials and technologies, economic hardships, and significant gaps in border control among the states of the former Soviet Union. The problems of organized crime and corruption in the states of the former Soviet Union increase the potential for proliferation of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons and related materials.

(5) The conditions described in paragraph (4) have substantially increased the ability of potentially hostile nations, terrorist groups, and individuals to acquire weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies from within the states of the former Soviet Union and from unemployed scientists who worked on those programs.

(6) As a result of such conditions, the capability of potentially hostile nations and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons is greater than at any time in history.

(7) The President has identified North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya as hostile states which already possess some weapons of mass destruction and are developing others.

(8) The acquisition or the development and use of weapons of mass destruction is well within the capability of many extremist and terrorist movements, acting independently or as proxies for foreign states.

(9) Foreign states can transfer weapons to or otherwise aid extremist and terrorist movements indirectly and with plausible deniability.

(10) Terrorist groups have already conducted chemical attacks against civilian targets in the United States and Japan, and a radiological attack in Russia.

(11) The potential for the national security of the United States to be threatened by nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological terrorism must be taken seriously.

(12) There is a significant and growing threat of attack by weapons of mass destruction on targets that are not military targets in the usual sense of the term.

(13) Concomitantly, the threat posed to the citizens of the United States by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons delivered by unconventional means is significant and growing.

(14) Mass terror may result from terrorist incidents involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical materials.

(15) Facilities required for production of radiological, biological, and chemical weapons are much smaller and harder to detect than nuclear weapons facilities, and biological and chemical weapons can be deployed by alternative delivery means other than long-range ballistic missiles.

(16) Covert or unconventional means of delivery of nuclear, radiological, biological, and