

Surface Transportation Board under subtitle IV of title 49. In any action under this section in which the plaintiff substantially prevails, the court shall award the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, to such plaintiff.

(Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, §16, 38 Stat. 737; Pub. L. 94-435, title III, §302(3), Sept. 30, 1976, 90 Stat. 1396; Pub. L. 104-88, title III, §318(3), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 949.)

Editorial Notes

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The antitrust laws, referred to in text, are defined in section 12 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1995—Pub. L. 104-88 substituted “for injunctive relief against any common carrier subject to the jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board under subtitle IV of title 49” for “in equity for injunctive relief against any common carrier subject to the provisions of the Act to regulate commerce, approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, in respect of any matter subject to the regulation, supervision, or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.”

1976—Pub. L. 94-435 inserted provision authorizing court to award costs, including attorneys' fees, to a successful plaintiff.

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1995 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 104-88 effective Jan. 1, 1996, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104-88, set out as an Effective Date note under section 1301 of Title 49, Transportation.

§ 26a. Restrictions on the purchase of gasohol and synthetic motor fuel

(a) Limitations on the use of credit instruments; sales, resales, and transfers

Except as provided in subsection (b), it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, directly or indirectly to impose any condition, restriction, agreement, or understanding that—

(1) limits the use of credit instruments in any transaction concerning the sale, resale, or transfer of gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel of equivalent usability in any case in which there is no similar limitation on transactions concerning such person's conventional motor fuel; or

(2) otherwise unreasonably discriminates against or unreasonably limits the sale, resale, or transfer of gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel of equivalent usability in any case in which such synthetic or conventional motor fuel is sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States.

(b) Credit fees; equivalent conventional motor fuel sales; labeling of pumps; product liability disclaimers; advertising support; furnishing facilities

(1) Nothing in this section or in any other provision of law in effect on December 2, 1980, which is specifically applicable to the sale of petroleum products shall preclude any person referred to in subsection (a) from imposing a reasonable fee for credit on the sale, resale, or transfer of

the gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel referred to in subsection (a) if such fee equals no more than the actual costs to such person of extending that credit.

(2) The prohibitions in this section shall not apply to any person who makes available sufficient supplies of gasohol and other synthetic motor fuels of equivalent usability to satisfy his customers' needs for such products, if the gasohol and other synthetic fuels are made available on terms and conditions which are equivalent to the terms and conditions on which such person's conventional motor fuel products are made available.

(3) Nothing in this section shall—

(A) preclude any person referred to in subsection (a) from requiring reasonable labeling of pumps dispensing the gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel referred to in subsection (a) to indicate, as appropriate, that such gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel is not manufactured, distributed, or sold by such person;

(B) preclude such person from issuing appropriate disclaimers of product liability for damage resulting from use of the gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel;

(C) require such person to provide advertising support for the gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel; or

(D) require such person to furnish or provide, at such person's own expense, any additional pumps, tanks, or other related facilities required for the sale of the gasohol or other synthetic motor fuel.

(c) “United States” defined

As used in this section, “United States” includes the several States, the District of Columbia, any territory of the United States, and any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States.

(Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, §26, as added Pub. L. 96-493, §2, Dec. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 2568.)

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

SHORT TITLE

For short title of Pub. L. 96-493 as the “Gasohol Competition Act of 1980”, see section 1 of Pub. L. 96-493, set out as a Short Title of 1980 Amendment note under section 1 of this title.

§ 26b. Application of antitrust laws to professional major league baseball

(a) Major league baseball subject to antitrust laws

Subject to subsections (b) through (d), the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports business affecting interstate commerce.

(b) Limitation of section

No court shall rely on the enactment of this section as a basis for changing the application of

the antitrust laws to any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than those set forth in subsection (a). This section does not create, permit or imply a cause of action by which to challenge under the antitrust laws, or otherwise apply the antitrust laws to, any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that do not directly relate to or affect employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major league level, including but not limited to—

(1) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of organized professional baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball at the minor league level, any organized professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any reserve clause as applied to minor league players;

(2) the agreement between organized professional major league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, commonly known as the “Professional Baseball Agreement”, the relationship between organized professional major league baseball and organized professional minor league baseball, or any other matter relating to organized professional baseball’s minor leagues;

(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of organized professional baseball relating to or affecting franchise expansion, location or relocation, franchise ownership issues, including ownership transfers, the relationship between the Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners, the marketing or sales of the entertainment product of organized professional baseball and the licensing of intellectual property rights owned or held by organized professional baseball teams individually or collectively;

(4) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected by Public Law 87–331 (15 U.S.C. § 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the “Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961”);

(5) the relationship between persons in the business of organized professional baseball and umpires or other individuals who are employed in the business of organized professional baseball by such persons; or

(6) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons not in the business of organized professional major league baseball.

(c) Standing to sue

Only a major league baseball player has standing to sue under this section. For the purposes of this section, a major league baseball player is—

(1) a person who is a party to a major league player’s contract, or is playing baseball at the major league level; or

(2) a person who was a party to a major league player’s contract or playing baseball at the major league level at the time of the injury that is the subject of the complaint; or

(3) a person who has been a party to a major league player’s contract or who has played baseball at the major league level, and who claims he has been injured in his efforts to secure a subsequent major league player’s con-

tract by an alleged violation of the antitrust laws: *Provided however*, That for the purposes of this paragraph, the alleged antitrust violation shall not include any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized professional baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball at the minor league level, including any organized professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any reserve clause as applied to minor league players; or

(4) a person who was a party to a major league player’s contract or who was playing baseball at the major league level at the conclusion of the last full championship season immediately preceding the expiration of the last collective bargaining agreement between persons in the business of organized professional major league baseball and the exclusive collective bargaining representative of major league baseball players.

(d) Conduct, acts, practices, or agreements subject to antitrust laws

(1) As used in this section, “person” means any entity, including an individual, partnership, corporation, trust or unincorporated association or any combination or association thereof. As used in this section, the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, its member leagues and the clubs of those leagues, are not “in the business of organized professional major league baseball”.

(2) In cases involving conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that directly relate to or affect both employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major league level and also relate to or affect any other aspect of organized professional baseball, including but not limited to employment to play baseball at the minor league level and the other areas set forth in subsection (b), only those components, portions or aspects of such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that directly relate to or affect employment of major league players to play baseball at the major league level may be challenged under subsection (a) and then only to the extent that they directly relate to or affect employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major league level.

(3) As used in subsection (a), interpretation of the term “directly” shall not be governed by any interpretation of section 151 et seq. of title 29, United States Code (as amended).

(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the application to organized professional baseball of the nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws.

(5) The scope of the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements covered by subsection (b) shall not be strictly or narrowly construed.

(Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 27, as added Pub. L. 105–297, § 3, Oct. 27, 1998, 112 Stat. 2824.)

Editorial Notes

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The antitrust laws, referred to in text, are defined in section 12 of this title.

Public Law 87–331, referred to in subsec. (b)(4), is Pub. L. 87–331, Sept. 30, 1961, 75 Stat. 732, which is classified

generally to chapter 32 (§1291 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.

CODIFICATION

Another section 27 of act Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, was renumbered section 28 and is classified to section 27 of this title.

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

PURPOSE

Pub. L. 105-297, §2, Oct. 27, 1998, 112 Stat. 2824, provided that: "It is the purpose of this legislation to state that major league baseball players are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that major league baseball players will have the same rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football and basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear that the passage of this Act [enacting this section and provisions set out as a note under section 1 of this title] does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any other person or entity."

§ 27. Effect of partial invalidity

If any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this Act shall, for any reason, be adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder thereof, but shall be confined in its operation to the clause, sentence, paragraph, or part thereof directly involved in the controversy in which such judgment shall have been rendered.

(Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, §28, formerly §26, 38 Stat. 740; renumbered §27, Pub. L. 96-493, §2, Dec. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 2568; renumbered §28, Pub. L. 107-273, div. C, title IV, §14102(d), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1922.)

Editorial Notes

REFERENCES IN TEXT

This Act, referred to in text, is act Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, known as the Clayton Act, which is classified generally to sections 12, 13, 14 to 19, 21, and 22 to 27 of this title, and sections 52 and 53 of Title 29, Labor. For further details and complete classification of this Act to the Code, see References in Text note set out under section 12 of this title and Tables.

§ 27a. Transferred

Editorial Notes

CODIFICATION

Section, act Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, §27, as added Pub. L. 105-297, §3, Oct. 27, 1998, 112 Stat. 2824, which related to application of antitrust laws to professional major league baseball, was transferred to section 26b of this title.

§ 28. Repealed. Pub. L. 98-620, title IV, § 402(11), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3358

Section, acts Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, §1, 32 Stat. 823; June 25, 1910, ch. 428, 36 Stat. 854; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §291, 36 Stat. 1167; Apr. 6, 1942, ch. 210, §1, 56 Stat. 198; June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §32(a), 62 Stat. 991; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §127, 63 Stat. 107; Dec. 21, 1974, Pub. L. 93-528, §4, 88 Stat. 1708, related to expedition of actions by the United States involving general public importance.

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPEAL

Repeal not applicable to cases pending on Nov. 8, 1984, see section 403 of Pub. L. 98-620, set out as an Effective Date note under section 1657 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.

§ 29. Appeals

(a) Court of appeals; review by Supreme Court

Except as otherwise expressly provided by this section, in every civil action brought in any district court of the United States under the Act entitled "An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies", approved July 2, 1890, or any other Acts having like purpose that have been or hereafter may be enacted, in which the United States is the complainant and equitable relief is sought, any appeal from a final judgment entered in any such action shall be taken to the court of appeals pursuant to sections 1291 and 2107 of title 28. Any appeal from an interlocutory order entered in any such action shall be taken to the court of appeals pursuant to sections 1292(a)(1) and 2107 of title 28 but not otherwise. Any judgment entered by the court of appeals in any such action shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court upon a writ of certiorari as provided in section 1254(1) of title 28.

(b) Direct appeals to Supreme Court

An appeal from a final judgment pursuant to subsection (a) shall lie directly to the Supreme Court, if, upon application of a party filed within fifteen days of the filing of a notice of appeal, the district judge who adjudicated the case enters an order stating that immediate consideration of the appeal by the Supreme Court is of general public importance in the administration of justice. Such order shall be filed within thirty days after the filing of a notice of appeal. When such an order is filed, the appeal and any cross appeal shall be docketed in the time and manner prescribed by the rules of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall thereupon either (1) dispose of the appeal and any cross appeal in the same manner as any other direct appeal authorized by law, or (2) in its discretion, deny the direct appeal and remand the case to the court of appeals, which shall then have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same as if the appeal and any cross appeal therein had been docketed in the court of appeals in the first instance pursuant to subsection (a).

(Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, §2, 32 Stat. 823; Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §291, 36 Stat. 1167; June 9, 1944, ch. 239, 58 Stat. 272; June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §17, 62 Stat. 989; Pub. L. 93-528, §5, Dec. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 1709.)

Editorial Notes

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Act entitled "An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies", approved July 2, 1890, referred to in subsec. (a), is known as the Sherman Act, and is classified to sections 1 to 7 of this title.

CODIFICATION

Section was previously set out in both this section and in section 45 of former Title 49, Transportation.