

## AMENDMENTS

1997—Pub. L. 105-26 amended section generally. Prior to amendment, section related to modification of anti-trust laws to allow two or more charitable organizations to use, or to agree to use, the same annuity rate in issuing one or more charitable gift annuities and to limitations on such conduct.

**Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

## EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1997 AMENDMENT

Pub. L. 105-26, §3, July 3, 1997, 111 Stat. 242, provided that: “This Act [see Short Title of 1997 Amendments note set out under section 1 of this title], and the amendments made by this Act, shall apply with respect to all conduct occurring before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 3, 1997] and shall apply in all administrative and judicial actions pending on or commenced after the date of the enactment of this Act.”

## EFFECTIVE DATE

Pub. L. 104-63, §4, Dec. 8, 1995, 109 Stat. 688, provided that: “This Act [enacting this section, section 37a of this title, and provisions set out as a note under section 1 of this title] shall apply with respect to conduct occurring before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 8, 1995].”

## STUDY AND REPORT

Pub. L. 105-26, §4, July 3, 1997, 111 Stat. 242, provided that:

“(a) **STUDY AND REPORT.**—The Attorney General shall carry out a study to determine the effect of this Act [see Short Title of 1997 Amendments note set out under section 1 of this title] on markets for noncharitable annuities, charitable gift annuities, and charitable remainder trusts. The Attorney General shall prepare a report summarizing the results of the study.

“(b) **DETAILS OF STUDY AND REPORT.**—The report referred to in subsection (a) shall include any information on possible inappropriate activity resulting from this Act and any recommendations for legislative changes, including recommendations for additional enforcement resources.

“(c) **SUBMISSION OF REPORT.**—The Attorney General shall submit the report referred to in subsection (a) to the Chairman and the ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and to the Chairman and the ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, not later than 27 months after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 3, 1997].”

**§ 37a. Definitions**

For purposes of this section and section 37 of this title:

**(1) Antitrust laws**

The term “antitrust laws” has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of section 12 of this title, except that such term includes section 45 of this title to the extent that such section 45 applies to unfair methods of competition.

**(2) Charitable remainder trust**

The term “charitable remainder trust” has the meaning given it in section 664(d) of title 26.

**(3) Charitable gift annuity**

The term “charitable gift annuity” has the meaning given it in section 501(m)(5) of title 26.

**(4) Final determination**

The term “final determination” includes an Internal Revenue Service determination, after

exhaustion of donor’s and donee’s administrative remedies, disallowing the donor’s charitable deduction for the year in which the initial contribution was made because of the donee’s failure to comply at such time with the requirements of section 501(m)(5) or 664(d), respectively, of title 26.

**(5) Person**

The term “person” has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of section 12 of this title.

**(6) State**

The term “State” has the meaning given it in section 15g(2) of this title.

(Pub. L. 104-63, §3, Dec. 8, 1995, 109 Stat. 687; Pub. L. 105-26, §2(2), July 3, 1997, 111 Stat. 242.)

**Editorial Notes**

## AMENDMENTS

1997—Pars. (1), (2). Pub. L. 105-26, §2(2)(A)–(C), added par. (2), redesignated former par. (2) as (1), and struck out heading and text of former par. (1). Text read as follows: “The term ‘annuity rate’ means the percentage of the fair market value of a gift (determined as of the date of the gift) given in exchange for a charitable gift annuity, that represents the amount of the annual payment to be made to 1 or 2 annuitants over the life of either or both under the terms of the agreement to give such gift in exchange for such annuity.”

Pars. (4) to (6). Pub. L. 105-26, §2(2)(D), (E), added par. (4) and redesignated former pars. (4) and (5) as (5) and (6), respectively.

**Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

## EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1997 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 105-26 applicable with respect to all conduct occurring before, on, or after July 3, 1997, and applicable in all administrative and judicial actions pending on or commenced after July 3, 1997, see section 3 of Pub. L. 105-26, set out as a note under section 37 of this title.

## EFFECTIVE DATE

Section applicable with respect to conduct occurring before, on, or after Dec. 8, 1995, see section 4 of Pub. L. 104-63, set out as a note under section 37 of this title.

**§ 37b. Confirmation of antitrust status of graduate medical resident matching programs****(a) Findings and purposes****(1) Findings**

Congress makes the following findings:

(A) For over 50 years, most United States medical school seniors and the large majority of graduate medical education programs (popularly known as “residency programs”) have chosen to use a matching program to match medical students with residency programs to which they have applied. These matching programs have been an integral part of an educational system that has produced the finest physicians and medical researchers in the world.

(B) Before such matching programs were instituted, medical students often felt pressure, at an unreasonably early stage of their medical education, to seek admission to, and accept offers from, residency programs. As a result, medical students often made binding commitments before they were in a position

to make an informed decision about a medical specialty or a residency program and before residency programs could make an informed assessment of students' qualifications. This situation was inefficient, chaotic, and unfair and it often led to placements that did not serve the interests of either medical students or residency programs.

(C) The original matching program, now operated by the independent non-profit National Resident Matching Program and popularly known as "the Match", was developed and implemented more than 50 years ago in response to widespread student complaints about the prior process. This Program includes on its board of directors individuals nominated by medical student organizations as well as by major medical education and hospital associations.

(D) The Match uses a computerized mathematical algorithm, as students had recommended, to analyze the preferences of students and residency programs and match students with their highest preferences from among the available positions in residency programs that listed them. Students thus obtain a residency position in the most highly ranked program on their list that has ranked them sufficiently high among its preferences. Each year, about 85 percent of participating United States medical students secure a place in one of their top 3 residency program choices.

(E) Antitrust lawsuits challenging the matching process, regardless of their merit or lack thereof, have the potential to undermine this highly efficient, pro-competitive, and long-standing process. The costs of defending such litigation would divert the scarce resources of our country's teaching hospitals and medical schools from their crucial missions of patient care, physician training, and medical research. In addition, such costs may lead to abandonment of the matching process, which has effectively served the interests of medical students, teaching hospitals, and patients for over half a century.

## **(2) Purposes**

It is the purpose of this section to—

(A) confirm that the antitrust laws do not prohibit sponsoring, conducting, or participating in a graduate medical education residency matching program, or agreeing to do so; and

(B) ensure that those who sponsor, conduct or participate in such matching programs are not subjected to the burden and expense of defending against litigation that challenges such matching programs under the antitrust laws.

## **(b) Application of antitrust laws to graduate medical education residency matching programs**

### **(1) Definitions**

In this subsection:

#### **(A) Antitrust laws**

The term "antitrust laws"—

(i) has the meaning given such term in subsection (a) of section 12 of this title, except that such term includes section 45 of this title to the extent such section 45 applies to unfair methods of competition; and

(ii) includes any State law similar to the laws referred to in clause (i).

### **(B) Graduate medical education program**

The term "graduate medical education program" means—

(i) a residency program for the medical education and training of individuals following graduation from medical school;

(ii) a program, known as a specialty or subspecialty fellowship program, that provides more advanced training; and

(iii) an institution or organization that operates, sponsors or participates in such a program.

### **(C) Graduate medical education residency matching program**

The term "graduate medical education residency matching program" means a program (such as those conducted by the National Resident Matching Program) that, in connection with the admission of students to graduate medical education programs, uses an algorithm and matching rules to match students in accordance with the preferences of students and the preferences of graduate medical education programs.

### **(D) Student**

The term "student" means any individual who seeks to be admitted to a graduate medical education program.

## **(2) Confirmation of antitrust status**

It shall not be unlawful under the antitrust laws to sponsor, conduct, or participate in a graduate medical education residency matching program, or to agree to sponsor, conduct, or participate in such a program. Evidence of any of the conduct described in the preceding sentence shall not be admissible in Federal court to support any claim or action alleging a violation of the antitrust laws.

## **(3) Applicability**

Nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt from the antitrust laws any agreement on the part of 2 or more graduate medical education programs to fix the amount of the stipend or other benefits received by students participating in such programs.

## **(c) Effective date**

This section shall take effect on April 10, 2004, shall apply to conduct whether it occurs prior to, on, or after April 10, 2004, and shall apply to all judicial and administrative actions or other proceedings pending on April 10, 2004.

(Pub. L. 108-218, title II, §207, Apr. 10, 2004, 118 Stat. 611.)

## **§ 38. Association of marine insurance companies; application of antitrust laws**

(a) Whenever used in this section—

(1) The term "association" means any association, exchange, pool, combination, or other arrangement for concerted action; and